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 “No Earlier Confession to Repeat”: 
Seibert, Dixon, and Question-First 
Interrogations† 
Lee S. Brett* 
Abstract 
 
The Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Missouri v. Seibert 
forbade the use of so-called question-first interrogations. In a 
question-first interrogation, police interrogate suspects without 
giving Miranda warnings. Once the suspect makes incriminating 
statements, the police give the warnings and induce the suspect 
to repeat their earlier admissions.  
Lower courts are increasingly interpreting a per curiam 
Supreme Court case, Bobby v. Dixon, to significantly limit the 
scope and applicability of Seibert. These courts claim that post-
warning statements need only be suppressed under Seibert when 
there is an “earlier confession to repeat.” In this Note, I argue 
that this reading of Dixon is erroneous for three reasons. First, 
the language that lower courts seize upon was obiter dictum. 
Second, the rule created by a categorical reading of Dixon is 
unworkable. And third, a limiting reading is inconsistent with 
the specific dangers of question-first interrogations and the 
rationales identified in the Seibert decision. When police 
undermine the effectiveness of Miranda warnings by using 
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question-first tactics, any statements made after the warnings 
should be suppressed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On October 24, 2011, Bobby Johnson went to a police 
station to speak with detectives about the robbery and murder 
of a motel clerk in Charlotte, North Carolina.1 After Johnson 
arrived, police escorted him to a locked room and interrogated 
him.2 Detectives suspected Johnson of involvement, but 
refrained from giving him Miranda warnings for more than four 
hours.3 
Within about twenty minutes of the interview beginning, 
two detectives showed Johnson DNA evidence which purported 
to establish his guilt.4 The detectives confronted Johnson with a 
variety of interrogation tactics.5 They spoke to Johnson with 
apparent certainty that he was guilty: “Where we stand right 
now as a law enforcement agency . . . is that there’s no question 
anymore. That’s the meat and potatoes right there for the case 
[pointing at the DNA analysis]. That’s enough to charge you 
with murder right now. Right now.”6 They feigned sympathy 
 
 1. State v. Johnson, 795 S.E.2d 625, 627–28 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017), 
modified and aff’d, 821 S.E.2d 822 (N.C. 2018), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 122 
(2019). The author participated in this case on petition to the Supreme Court 
for a writ of certiorari.  
 2. Id. at 628. 
 3. See id. (noting that the interview began at 9:50 am); id. at 632 
(recording that a detective read Johnson his Miranda rights at 2:14 pm); see 
also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–73 (1966) (outlining procedural 
requirements for police interrogations).  
 4. See Johnson, 795 S.E.2d at 628 (stating that police showed Johnson 
the DNA report at 10:11 am). 
 5. See id. at 628–33 (describing the interrogation in detail). 
 6. Id. at 628. 
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with Johnson: “If the shooting was an accident, if Anita backed 
into the gun and ‘pow, holy shit,’ you didn’t mean for that to 
happen, now’s the time to talk about it.”7 They cajoled him to 
cooperate: “The time to get on the bus and get the best seat is 
now.”8 Both detectives alternated between brow-beating9 and 
offering help.10 
The reason for the detectives’ failure to give Miranda 
warnings is not explicit from the record, but circumstantial 
evidence suggests that warnings were deliberately withheld.11 
At one point in the interview, a detective seemed to ask Johnson 
to confirm that he was not in custody12:  
Detective Ward asked Defendant if he thought he was going 
to be able to go home “today.” When Defendant answered 
that he did not, he was told, “Then you’re under arrest for 
murder.” Detective Whitworth told him: “If you don’t believe 
that you can get up and walk out of here, then I have no 
choice. You just told me that you believe you’re going to jail.” 
Detective Ward then asked Defendant: “Did you just say 
that, yes or no?” Defendant responded: “Yes sir.” Detective 
Ward responded: “Then I’m going to have to place you under 
arrest and then I’ve got some stuff to do before I continue. 
Because to be voluntary you’ve got to believe you can walk 
out of here.”13 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 630. 
 9. See id. at 631 (“‘You did what you did.’ ‘You’re full of shit.’ ‘You’re 
done.’”). 
 10. See id. at 633 (“Detective Ward assured Defendant he did not ‘have a 
problem taking the stand of behalf of a defendant.’”). 
 11. See id. at 631 (detailing how police attempted to get Johnson to admit 
that he was not in custody).  
 12. If Johnson was not in custody, police would not be required to issue 
Miranda warnings. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 434 (1984) 
(holding that Miranda applies only when a person is “subjected to custodial 
interrogation”). 
 13. State v. Johnson, 795 S.E.2d 625, 631 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017). 
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Even after this conversation—during which Johnson twice 
stated that he did not think he could leave—the detectives did 
not Mirandize Johnson for at least another two hours.14 
Regardless of why the police withheld Miranda warnings, 
it appears clear from the record that police wore down Johnson’s 
resistance during the four unwarned hours of the interview.15 
Johnson consistently denied involvement throughout this 
period.16 But he seemed to progressively despair.17 The 
detectives repeatedly told Johnson that the DNA evidence was 
incontrovertible evidence of his guilt: 
Defendant was told that DNA analysts do not make 
mistakes, and he needed to “do the right thing.” Defendant 
was told that the DNA evidence was “pretty damning, that 
puts you there.” Defendant responded “That put me there, 
man. That right there just took my life. That right there just 
took my life.”18 
Johnson began to signal that he wanted to help: “I don’t 
want to be in prison the rest of my damn life.”19 But he continued 
to deny involvement.20 Detectives urged him to “get the best seat 
on the bus,” and Johnson said that he was trying to.21 Johnson 
began crying.22 He told detectives that he felt sick, spat into a 
 
 14. See id. at 631–33 (recording that Johnson stated that he could not 
leave twice at some point before 12:20 pm, and that he was given Miranda 
warnings at 2:14 pm). This Note adopts the common practice of using 
“Mirandize” as a verb, meaning the issuance of the warnings required by 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 15. See id. at 628–33 (detailing Johnson’s increasingly emotional and 
desperate responses to police questioning).  
 16. See id. (listing repeated, consistent denials of involvement until after 
Miranda warnings). 
 17. See id. (describing Johnson’s signs of distress, such as crying, silence, 
nausea, and putting his head in his hands). 
 18. Id. at 629. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. at 630 (“Defendant was then asked again if he had shot Anita, 
or had been with the person who had, and Defendant again replied, ‘no.’ 
Defendant was told that the detectives did not believe him, and Defendant 
replied, ‘I know you don’t.’”). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
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trash can, and repeated, “I’m about to lose my life.”23 Police 
intensified the pressure, apparently sensing the end: “There’s 
only one thing to do in this room.” “You know it’s over.” “You are 
almost there.”24 
The detectives left Johnson alone for about forty minutes 
and permitted him a bathroom break.25 When the interview 
resumed, the detectives formally arrested Johnson.26 One 
detective explained to Johnson why he did this: “I felt like I had 
to make you a believer, you weren’t believing us. I felt in my 
heart like the only thing that’s going to make you understand 
that this isn’t going to go away is to charge you with murder. So 
I charged you with murder.”27 
After arresting Johnson, the detectives still did not give him 
Miranda warnings for another eleven minutes.28 Twenty 
minutes after he received warnings, Johnson gave up: “I’m 
already dead, should I just kill myself all the way?”29 He told the 
detectives: “I wasn’t the gunman,” and named two others.30  
The Johnson case illustrates the use of a police technique 
known as “question-first, warn-later” interrogation.31 In a 
“question-first” interrogation, police interrogate a suspect 
without providing Miranda warnings.32 Once the suspect 
 
 23. See id. (describing Johnson’s tears, nausea, and statement). 
 24. Id. at 631. 
 25. Id. at 632. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 633. 
 28. Id. at 632. 
 29. Id. at 633. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Eric English, Note, You Have the Right to Remain Silent. Now 
Please Repeat Your Confession: Missouri v. Seibert and the Court’s Attempt to 
Put an End to the Question-First Technique, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 423, 439 (2006) 
(describing “question-first” interrogations). This technique is also sometimes 
called “midstream Miranda,” “Miranda in the middle,” or “two-step 
interrogation,” but this Note will use “question-first” for internal consistency. 
See United States v. Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 420, 422 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(referring to “Miranda-in-the-middle”); United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 
1148, 1150 (9th Cir. 2006) (using “two-step” and “midstream Miranda” 
nomenclature). 
 32. English, supra note 31, at 424. 
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incriminates herself, police give the Miranda warnings and 
induce the suspect to repeat her confession.33 Not knowing that 
the earlier statements were inadmissible, the suspect invariably 
does so.34 Five Supreme Court justices condemned this practice 
in Missouri v. Seibert,35 concluding that “the question-first tactic 
effectively threatens to thwart Miranda’s purpose” by “draining 
the substance out of Miranda.”36 
The Seibert decision, however, caused a great deal of 
confusion.37 Because the Court failed to muster a majority, 
federal and state courts alike are divided on whether the 
plurality opinion or Justice Kennedy’s concurrence should 
govern.38 The Supreme Court has not clarified the issue.39 
Indeed, the only Supreme Court decision to substantively cite 
and apply Seibert actually added to the confusion.40 In Bobby v. 
Dixon,41 a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court noted that 
Seibert did not apply because there was “no earlier confession to 
repeat.”42 Lower courts seized upon this language, and now 
increasingly find that Seibert does not apply if no confession was 
elicited during the unwarned portion of an interrogation.43 
Rather than engaging with a detailed analysis of either the 
 
 33. Id. at 442. 
 34. See id. (explaining suspects’ reasonable assumptions about unwarned 
confessions). 
 35. 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
 36. Id. at 617. 
 37. See Joshua I. Rodriguez, Note, Interrogation First, Miranda Warnings 
Afterward: A Critical Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Approach to Delayed 
Miranda Warnings, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1091, 1105 (2013) (detailing conflict 
over the governing decision). 
 38. See id. at 1106–17 (discussing confusion in federal and state courts in 
the wake of Seibert). 
 39. See, e.g., Wass v. Idaho, 138 S. Ct. 2706, 2706 (2018) (denying 
certiorari to petitioner seeking clarification on the meaning of Seibert). 
 40. See Bobby v. Dixon, 565 U.S. 23, 31 (2011) (per curiam) 
(distinguishing Seibert because there was “no earlier confession to repeat”). 
 41. 565 U.S. 23 (2011) (per curiam). 
 42. Id. at 31. 
 43. See, e.g., People v. Krebs, 452 P.3d 609, 647 (Cal. 2019) (finding 
Seibert inapplicable because officer “advised defendant of his Miranda rights 
before defendant confessed”).  
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plurality or concurrence tests, these courts treat Dixon as a per 
se rule which narrows the scope of Seibert.44 
This Note argues that lower courts’ reliance on dictum from 
Dixon is gravely misplaced.45 The Seibert decision was a 
response to police gamesmanship “dedicated to draining the 
substance out of Miranda.”46 To assert that Seibert only applies 
where there is “no earlier confession to repeat” is to dramatically 
limit the scope and applicability of the decision.47 Using the 
Johnson case to provide concrete examples, this Note also 
explains why drawing the line at “confessions” fails to 
accurately apply the rule in Seibert.48 Question-first 
interrogations which compromise the effectiveness of Miranda 
warnings should result in suppression of post-warning 
statements, regardless of whether there was an “earlier 
confession to repeat.”49  
Part I of this Note begins by tracing the background of and 
developments in the law of confessions, from voluntariness to 
Miranda and beyond.50 Part II discusses the Seibert decision in 
detail, noting confusion in lower courts about the governing 
opinion before endorsing the plurality test.51 Despite the 
uncertainty surrounding the governing opinion in Seibert, this 
Note identifies “effectiveness” as the linchpin of both Justice 
Souter’s plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurring 
opinion.52 Part II looks to both opinions to identify three 
interrelated threats created by question-first interrogations: 
timing, confusion, and the “cat out of the bag” problem.53 In a 
broader sense, Part II considers two rationales motivating the 
 
 44. See, e.g., United States v. Iles, 753 F. App’x 107, 110 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(“Furthermore, Seibert does not apply because Iles did not make any 
incriminating statements before she signed the Miranda waiver.”). 
 45. See infra Part III and accompanying text. 
 46. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617. 
 47. Dixon, 565 U.S. at 31; see infra Part III and accompanying text. 
 48. See infra Part III and accompanying text. 
 49. See infra Part IV and accompanying text. 
 50. See infra Part I and accompanying text. 
 51. See infra Part II and accompanying text. 
 52. See infra Part II.A.2 and accompanying text. 
 53. See infra Part II.A.5 and accompanying text. 
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Seibert decision: disapproval of police gamesmanship, and 
avoidance of false confessions.54 Part II examines Bobby v. 
Dixon, and—more importantly—the lower courts’ 
interpretations of Dixon, which treat dictum (“no earlier 
confession to repeat”) as a per se modification of Seibert.55 Part 
III argues that lower courts’ readings of Dixon are erroneous in 
light of the text of Dixon, the practical limitations of a 
categorical reading, and the dangers and rationales identified in 
Part II.56 Finally, Part IV highlights the continued importance 
of the issue, and recommends that advocates raise Seibert issues 
on appeal in order to obtain clarification from the Supreme 
Court.57 
I.  THE LAW OF CONFESSIONS 
A.  Background 
Confessions are a critical part of our justice system.58 Other 
types of evidence—physical evidence, for example—are not 
always available.59 And even the best physical evidence often 
lacks the context and comprehensiveness of a confession.60 
Imagine that a man is charged with driving under the influence 
after he was discovered asleep in his car. Blood samples or a 
 
 54. See infra Part II.A.6 and accompanying text. 
 55. See infra Part II.B and accompanying text. 
 56. See infra Part III and accompanying text. 
 57. See infra Part IV and accompanying text. 
 58. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 108 (2010) (calling confessions 
“essential to society’s compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing 
those who violate the law”); Fred E. Inbau, Police Interrogation—A Practical 
Necessity, 52 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 16, 16 (1961) (“Many 
criminal cases, even when investigated by the best qualified police 
departments, are capable of solution only by means of an admission or 
confession from the guilty individual . . . .”). 
 59. See David Crump, Why Do We Admit Criminal Confessions into 
Evidence?, 43 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 71, 75 (2019) (noting that arson is “virtually 
impossible to prove without confessions,” because “the most telling evidence is 
obliterated by the crime itself”). 
 60. See id. at 88 (discussing narrative weaknesses in prosecutions which 
lack confessions, even where there is physical evidence). 
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Breathalyzer might confirm that the man was intoxicated at the 
time of arrest, but cannot confirm whether the man was driving. 
But if the suspect tells police that he had five or six drinks at 
the bar, started to drive home, and then pulled over to sleep, 
then the evidence is all in one place and there is little room for 
doubt. 
There is great narrative appeal to confessions.61 Trial 
lawyers have long known that storytelling is a critical part of 
persuading a jury.62 Confessions tell the story straight from the 
horse’s mouth.63 Physical evidence has to be interpreted by 
experts, and sometimes those experts disagree about the 
meaning of the evidence.64 But inculpatory information directly 
from the defendant is difficult for a layperson to parse or 
rationalize.65 This explains why law enforcement officers 
routinely interrogate suspects and seek confessions.66 As Justice 
White noted:  
A confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, “the 
defendant’s own confession is probably the most probative 
and damaging evidence that can be admitted against 
him . . . . The admissions of a defendant come from the actor 
 
 61. See id. at 87 (describing “juror expectations about coherent 
narratives” as one justification for admitting confessions into evidence). 
 62. See SAM SCHRAGER, THE TRIAL LAWYER’S ART 210 (1999) (“Jury trials 
are storytelling contests . . . . Professional judges would not be receptive to the 
craft’s method of telling stories. Lay jurors are.”). 
 63. See Crump, supra note 59, at 74 (noting that confessions offer 
evidence which is “not publicly available and that would not be accessible to 
anyone but the perpetrator . . . .”). 
 64. See, e.g., Woodfox v. Cain, 609 F.3d 774, 810 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(recounting divergent testimony from fingerprint experts about the source of 
a print). 
 65. See Crump, supra note 59, at 74 (observing that confessions might be 
considered “good evidence” because they “come from a person who usually 
knows the truth”). 
 66. See Richard A. Leo, Police Interrogation and Social Control, 3 SOC. & 
LEGAL STUDS. 93, 97 (1994) (discussing routine use of interrogation techniques 
designed to elicit confessions). 
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himself, the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source 
of information about his past conduct.”67  
Confessions, however, are not an unmitigated good.68 If 
improperly obtained, they can serve as a nail in an innocent 
person’s coffin.69 The Innocence Project, for example, reports 
that between 15 and 25 percent of DNA-exonerated defendants 
confessed prior to their trials.70 Although this might seem 
counterintuitive to laypersons,71 courts have long recognized 
potential reliability concerns.72 The development of English and 
American law reflects increasing judicial caution about the 
admissibility of criminal confessions.73 
B.  Voluntariness 
For most of American history, the primary legal challenge 
to a confession was the claim that it had been involuntary.74 
English and American courts at common law rejected 
confessions extracted by threats, violence, or promises.75 
 
 67. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) (quoting Bruton v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139–40 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)).  
 68. See Eugene R. Milhizer, Rethinking Police Interrogation: 
Encouraging Reliable Confessions While Respecting Suspects’ Dignity, 41 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (2006) (lauding confessions but noting the “potential for police 
misconduct and abuse”). 
 69. See David K. Shipler, Why Do Innocent People Confess?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 26, 2012, at SR6 (describing police interrogation tactics that result in 
false confessions). 
 70. Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put 
Innocents at Risk?, 60 AM. PSYCH. 215, 216 (2005). 
 71. See Shipler, supra note 69, at SR6 (“Intuition holds that the innocent 
do not make false confessions.”). 
 72. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432–33 (2000) 
(discussing early English cases on confessions). 
 73. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.1(c) (4th ed. 
2018) (describing Supreme Court responses to police conduct of 
interrogations). 
 74. See OTIS H. STEPHENS, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF 
GUILT 20 (1973) (explaining the exclusion of involuntary confessions at 
common law). 
 75. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 73, at § 6.2 (describing 
development of voluntariness doctrine at common law). 
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Eventually, these common law principles were 
constitutionalized via the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment76 and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.77  
The voluntariness doctrine served to curb some of the most 
egregious abuses of police authority in interrogation rooms.78 
But commentators criticized the doctrine, noting that 
case-by-case factual inquiries failed to provide clear and 
prospective guideposts for police or courts.79 By the 1960s, the 
Supreme Court had grown increasingly dissatisfied with the 
deterrent effect of voluntariness on police conduct.80 The Court 
also expressed frustration with the murky line-drawing 
required by the voluntariness doctrine.81 
C.  Miranda v. Arizona 
In 1966, the Warren Court decided to draw a brighter line.82 
Miranda v. Arizona83 was a seminal development in American 
 
 76. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 
(1897) (stating that the issue of involuntary confessions implicates the Fifth 
Amendment). 
 77. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 
(1936) (calling the use of confessions obtained by state torture a “clear denial 
of due process”). 
 78. See Eve B. Primus, The Future of Confession Law: Toward Rules for 
the Voluntariness Test, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015) (noting that existing 
voluntariness doctrine “allow[s] courts to step in when particularly egregious 
problems arise”). 
 79. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. 
L. REV. 865, 869 (1981) (criticizing the “vagueness” of the fact-specific “totality 
of the circumstances” test). 
 80. See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 
1977 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 102–03 (explaining how the “subtle and elusive” 
voluntariness doctrine made “some automatic device” for controlling police 
interrogations inevitable). 
 81. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963) (“The line 
between proper and permissible police conduct and techniques . . . offensive to 
due process is, at best, a difficult one to draw . . . .”). 
 82. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (concluding that 
“proper safeguards” were necessary to “combat [the inherently compelling] 
pressures” of custodial interrogation). 
 83. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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criminal procedure and constitutional law.84 The case involved 
four consolidated conviction appeals.85 The defendant in each 
case incriminated himself during a police interrogation.86 
The Supreme Court decided to require police to provide a 
slew of warnings before any custodial interrogation.87 A suspect 
had to be advised of (1) the right to remain silent; (2) the 
potential use of any statement as evidence against him; (3) the 
right to an attorney; and (4) the right to have an appointed 
attorney if indigent.88 If police failed to obtain a valid waiver of 
these rights, then statements made by the defendant could not 
be used against him at trial.89 
Animating these new procedural safeguards was mounting 
alarm at sophisticated police interrogation practices.90 The 
Miranda Court cited shocking abuses, including the use of lit 
cigarette butts to secure incriminating statements from a 
witness.91 The Court emphasized that even in the absence of 
physical brutality, any custodial interrogation “exacts a heavy 
toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of 
individuals.”92 Although some interrogations still involved 
physical brutality, “the modern practice of in-custody 
 
 84. See Michael Edmund O’Neill, Undoing Miranda, 2000 BYU L. REV. 
185, 185 (calling Miranda an “icon of the Warren Court’s transformation of 
American criminal procedure”).  
 85. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491–99 (listing facts of four consolidated 
appeals). 
 86. See id. at 445 (“[Each case] thus share[s] salient features—
incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated 
atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings 
of constitutional rights.”). 
 87. See id. at 444 (summarizing holding). 
 88. See id. (“Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he 
has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as 
evidence against him, and that he has the right to an attorney, either retained 
or appointed.”). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id. at 444–56 (introducing the need to curb “overzealous” police 
conduct before describing police interrogation techniques). 
 91. Id. at 446. 
 92. Id. at 455. 
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interrogation is psychologically rather than physically 
oriented.”93  
The Court was deeply disturbed by a series of 
psychologically manipulative techniques described in police 
training texts.94 Training materials encouraged police to isolate 
the suspect, to “[deprive him] of every psychological advantage,” 
and to act as if the guilt of the suspect was already known.95 The 
texts encouraged various techniques designed to elicit 
confessions.96 First, police might feign sympathy: “Joe, you 
probably didn’t go looking out for this fellow with the purpose of 
shooting him.”97 If this didn’t work, there was “Mutt and Jeff,” 
commonly known as “good cop, bad cop.”98 In this technique, one 
police officer would play “the relentless investigator, who knows 
the suspect is guilty and is not going to waste any time.”99 The 
other police officer would feign kindness, urging cooperation so 
as to stave off the hardhearted tactics of the other.100 Other 
techniques involved outright trickery, such as holding fake 
witness line-ups with coached “witnesses” who identified the 
suspect,101 or offering false legal advice.102 When “kindness and 
stratagems” failed, the training texts encouraged police to turn 
to “dogged persistence,” interrogating “steadily and without 
relent” to “dominate his subject and overwhelm him with the 
inexorable will to obtain the truth.”103 
 
 93. See id. at 445–48 (tracing “incommunicado” police interrogation 
practices including “the third degree”). 
 94. See id. at 448–56 (describing interrogation techniques which 
“trade . . . on the weakness of individuals”). Interestingly, many of these 
practices were still in use in 2011 during the Johnson case, forty-five years 
after the Miranda decision. See State v. Johnson, 795 S.E.2d 625, 628–33 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2017) (describing interrogation of Bobby Johnson). 
 95. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 450 (1966). 
 96. Id. at 448 & n.8. 
 97. Id. at 451–52. 
 98. Id. at 452. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 453. 
 102. Id. at 455. 
 103. Id. at 451. 
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Although such tactics were not technically coercive under 
the voluntariness doctrine,104 the Supreme Court thought that 
they nevertheless jeopardized the Fifth Amendment and were 
“equally destructive of human dignity.”105 The Miranda Court 
also expressed concerns about the reliability of aggressive 
techniques, warning that psychological manipulation could 
induce suspects to falsely implicate themselves.106 The Court 
described multiple cases in which defendants of “limited 
intelligence” had confessed to crimes that they never 
committed.107 Because of the privilege against 
self-incrimination, the human dignity interests, and the 
concerns about reliability, the Court mandated warnings in 
order to “dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial 
surroundings.”108 Absent such warnings, a confession could not 
“truly be the product of . . . free choice.”109 
D.  Limitations on the Miranda Exclusionary Rule 
Miranda’s sweeping language suggested that a violation of 
Miranda was a violation of the Fifth Amendment.110 The 
Supreme Court subsequently narrowed the scope and 
importance of Miranda significantly.111 
 
 104. See id. at 457 (“In these cases, we might not find the defendants’ 
statements to have been involuntary in traditional terms. Our concern for 
adequate safeguards to protect precious Fifth Amendment rights is, of course, 
not lessened in the slightest.”). 
 105. See id. (“To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally 
destructive of human dignity.”). 
 106. See id. at 455 & n.24 (warning about the danger of false confessions). 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. at 458. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. at 457–67 (describing applicability of the Fifth Amendment to 
custodial interrogations in detail). 
 111. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (distinguishing 
a Miranda violation from a Fifth Amendment violation). 
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First, the Supreme Court asserted that Miranda’s 
protections were broader than the Fifth Amendment itself.112 
Miranda was recast as a mere prophylactic rule designed to 
insulate Fifth Amendment protections by presuming coercion in 
the absence of warnings.113 Notwithstanding the presumption, 
a violation of Miranda was not necessarily a violation of the 
Fifth Amendment.114 
Given this revised interpretation, the Court permitted 
various exceptions for the exclusion of statements obtained in 
violation of Miranda.115 Statements taken in violation of 
Miranda could still be used to impeach a witness’ testimony.116 
Miranda warnings were also not required when public safety 
was jeopardized.117 Finally—and most relevant to this Note—
the Supreme Court sharply limited the exclusionary rule 
associated with Miranda.118 
In Oregon v. Elstad,119 a teenaged burglary suspect was 
briefly questioned at his parent’s home without receiving 
 
 112. See id. (“[Miranda’s] procedural safeguards were not themselves 
rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure [sic] 
that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected.”).  
 113. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 n.1 (1985) (“A Miranda 
violation does not constitute coercion but rather affords a bright-line, legal 
presumption of coercion, requiring suppression of unwarned statements.”). 
 114. See id. at 306 (noting that Miranda exclusion “may be triggered even 
in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation”). 
 115. See Paul G. Alvarez, Comment, Taking Back Miranda: How Seibert 
and Patane Can Keep “Question-First” and “Outside Miranda” Interrogation 
Tactics in Check, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1195, 1202–20 (2005) (summarizing 
exceptions and carveouts to the Miranda doctrine). 
 116. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) (permitting the use 
of excluded statements to impeach witness testimony). 
 117. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657–58 (1984) (“We conclude 
that the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the 
public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth 
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.”). 
 118. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 305–07, 309–14 (limiting the Miranda 
exclusionary rule by rejecting the “fruit of the poisonous tree” and “cat out of 
the bag” arguments). 
 119. 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
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Miranda warnings.120 The suspect, Elstad, implicated 
himself.121 Approximately one hour later, he was Mirandized 
and interrogated at the police station.122 Elstad again 
implicated himself, this time in writing.123  
Before trial, Elstad moved to suppress both his unwarned 
and warned statements.124 He offered two arguments for the 
suppression of the written confession: First, he argued that it 
should be excluded under the “fruit of the poisonous tree” 
doctrine because the written statement was functionally the 
product of the earlier, unwarned statement.125 Second, he 
argued that the unwarned verbal statement at his parents’ 
house had let the “cat out of the bag.”126 Elstad claimed that the 
psychological effect of making an earlier inculpatory statement 
undermined the voluntariness of the later, warned confession.127  
Because he had already implicated himself, he did not think 
that he could “get the cat back in the bag” by denying 
responsibility.128  
The Supreme Court flatly rejected both arguments.129 In 
rejecting Elstad’s first argument, the Court explained that the 
“fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine was only tied to 
constitutional violations.130 Because Miranda violations were 
not constitutional violations, the Miranda exclusionary rule 
afforded only “preventive medicine,” which “provides a remedy 
 
 120. See id. at 301 (recounting that Elstad said, “Yes, I was there” after 
police accused him of involvement in the burglary). 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. at 301–02. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 302. 
 125. See id. at 302–03 (summarizing defendant’s arguments). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 311 (citing United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947)). 
 128. See id. (explaining the “cat out of the bag” argument). 
 129. See id. at 305–07, 311–12 (rejecting the “fruit of the poisonous tree” 
argument and the “cat out of the bag” argument). 
 130. See id. at 305 (“Respondent’s contention that his confession was 
tainted by the earlier failure of police to provide Miranda warnings and must 
be excluded as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ assumes the existence of a 
constitutional violation.”). 
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even to the defendant who has suffered no identifiable 
constitutional harm.”131 
The Supreme Court also rejected Elstad’s “cat out of the 
bag” argument.132 Although an accused might think that he 
cannot “get the cat back in the bag” after implicating himself, 
this fell short of official coercion.133 The Court refused to 
recognize “the psychological impact of voluntary disclosure of a 
guilty secret . . . as state compulsion.”134 Such a rule would be 
“speculative and attenuated at best,” because “[i]t is difficult to 
tell with certainty what motivates a suspect to speak.”135 
Finally, treating “cat out of the bag” statements as coerced 
would deprive police of highly probative evidence that might 
have been the result of free will.136 
E.  Miranda Survives 
Miranda’s steady erosion at the hands of the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts led many commentators to think that the 
doctrine rested on unsteady ground.137 If Miranda was a mere 
 
 131. Id. at 307; see United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 634 (2004) 
(declining to apply exclusionary doctrine to physical “fruits” discovered via a 
Miranda violation). 
 132. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 311–12 (1985). 
 133. See id. at 312 (“There is a vast difference between the direct 
consequences flowing from coercion of a confession by physical violence or 
other deliberate means calculated to break the suspect’s will and the uncertain 
consequence of disclosure of a ‘guilty secret’ freely given in response to an 
unwarned but noncoercive question . . . .”). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 313–14. 
 136. See id. at 312 (“When neither the initial nor the subsequent 
admission is coerced, little justification exists for permitting the highly 
probative evidence of a voluntary confession to be irretrievably lost to the 
factfinder.”). 
 137. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Reaffirm Miranda Rule, 7–2; A Part 
of “Culture,” N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2000, at A1, A18 (“Miranda had appeared 
to be in jeopardy . . . because of the court’s perceived hostility to the original 
decision.”); JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 199–222 
(1993) (advocating the overruling of Miranda based on its purported 
constitutional illegitimacy); Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing 
the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law 
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“prophylactic rule,” was it then unenforceable on the states? 
And could it be overruled by an act of Congress? In Dickerson v. 
United States,138 the Supreme Court answered both questions in 
the negative.139 
Dickerson involved a 1968 statute that purported to 
overrule Miranda.140 Although the statute was virtually ignored 
by the executive branch and the judicial branch for decades,141 
the Fourth Circuit in 1999 applied the statute and admitted a 
confession obtained in violation of Miranda.142  
Chief Justice Rehnquist, a longtime critic of Miranda, 
penned the 7–2 decision that retained the doctrine.143 The Court 
held that Miranda was a “constitutional decision,” which was 
applicable to the states and could not be overruled by statute.144 
Citing stare decisis, the Court declined to overrule Miranda on 
its own.145 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that Miranda was 
 
Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1126–32 (1998) (urging the end of the 
“grand social experiment” of Miranda). 
 138. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 139. Id. at 432. 
 140. See Crime Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 701, 82 Stat. 210 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3501), invalidated by United States v. Dickerson, 530 
U.S. 428 (2000) (“[A] confession . . . shall be admissible in evidence if it is 
voluntarily given.”).  
 141. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 463–64 (1994) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“[W]ith limited exceptions [§ 3501] has been studiously avoided 
by every Administration, not only in this Court but in the lower courts, since 
its enactment more than 25 years ago.”). 
 142. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 1999), 
rev’d, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (rejecting Justice Department’s argument that 
§ 3501 was unconstitutional). 
 143. See Greenhouse, supra note 137, at A1 (calling Chief Justice 
Rehnquist an “early and tenacious” critic of Miranda); Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 
431 (ascribing authorship of opinion to Chief Justice Rehnquist). 
 144. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432 (“We hold that Miranda, being a 
constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act 
of Congress, and we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves.”). 
 145. See id. at 443 (“Whether or not we would agree with Miranda’s 
reasoning and its resulting rule, were we addressing the issue in the first 
instance, the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it 
now.”). 
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“embedded in routine police practice to the point where the 
warnings have become part of our national culture.”146  
Dickerson guaranteed Miranda’s continued vitality and 
constitutionality.147 Just four years later, though, Miranda 
came once more under attack.148 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT REJECTED QUESTION-FIRST, 
WARN-LATER INTERROGATION TACTICS 
A.  Missouri v. Seibert 
In Missouri v. Seibert,149 the Supreme Court encountered “a 
new challenge to Miranda.”150 Police officers in Rolla, Missouri, 
deliberately refrained from giving a murder suspect Miranda 
warnings.151 She was interrogated in custody for thirty to forty 
minutes before she admitted that she had been involved in the 
death of a mentally ill teenager.152 After giving Seibert a smoke 
break, police turned on a tape recorder, issued Miranda 
warnings, and obtained a waiver of rights.153 They then invited 
her to repeat her confession: “Ok [sic] [Pa]trice, we’ve been 
talking for a little while about what happened on Wednesday 
the twelfth, haven’t we? Now, in discussion you told us, you told 
us that there was an understanding about Donald.”154  
 
 146. Id.; see Victor Li, Think You Have the Right: The 50-Year Story of the 
Miranda Warning, 102 A.B.A. J. 34, 37 (2016) (recounting that Miranda’s 
cultural influence has been so prolific that “Russian TV shows have Russian 
police giving the Russian equivalent of the warning even though there’s no 
such requirement in Russian law” (quotations omitted)). 
 147. See Charles D. Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 1121, 1121 (2001) (describing Dickerson as “plac[ing] Miranda 
upon a more secure, constitutional footing”). 
 148. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 609 (2004) (describing a “new 
challenge to Miranda”). 
 149. 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
 150. Id. at 609. 
 151. Id. at 604–05. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
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Before trial, Seibert moved to suppress the entirety of the 
interrogation.155 The interrogating officer stated during the 
suppression hearing that he made a “conscious decision” to 
withhold Miranda warnings.156 He told the court that he had 
been trained to interrogate in this way: “[Q]uestion first, then 
give the warnings, and then repeat the question ‘until I get the 
answer that she’s already provided once.’”157 Rolla police officers 
testified that this strategy was not limited to their department: 
the Police Law Institute, a training organization, was among 
several national groups that advocated “question-first” 
interrogation practices.158  
The trial court suppressed the prewarning statements, but 
admitted everything that Seibert told police after she received 
Miranda warnings.159 The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, 
concluding that the case was governed by the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Oregon v. Elstad.160 The Supreme Court of 
Missouri reversed, distinguishing Elstad because the first 
elicited statement was nearly continuous with the second, and 
because the police intentionally deprived Seibert of the 
opportunity to knowingly and intelligently waive her Miranda 
rights.161 
  On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, five justices agreed 
that the question-first, warn-later interrogation violated 
Seibert’s Miranda rights.162 Unfortunately, the Court failed to 
marshal a majority.163 Four Justices—Souter, Ginsburg, 
Stevens, and Breyer—offered the plurality opinion.164 Justice 
 
 155. Id. at 605. 
 156. Id. at 605–06. 
 157. Id. at 606. 
 158. Id. at 609–10. 
 159. Id. at 606. 
 160. Id. See supra Part I.D for a discussion of Elstad. 
 161. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 606 (2004). 
 162. Id. at 604, 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 163. Id. at 604 (plurality opinion). 
 164. Id. Justice Breyer also wrote a separate concurrence but joined the 
plurality opinion in full. Id. at 617 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence primarily concerned his view that Miranda violations could bear 
“fruit of the poisonous tree,” contrary to the holding of Elstad. Compare id. 
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Kennedy concurred only in the judgment.165 And four Justices—
O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas—dissented.166  
1.  Federal and State Courts Are Divided About the 
Governing Opinion in Seibert 
Before analyzing the Seibert decision in detail, it is 
important to note that federal and state courts are divided on 
Seibert’s governing opinion.167 Seibert was a plurality decision, 
so courts apply the “narrowest grounds” doctrine to decide 
which opinion speaks for the Supreme Court.168 In Marks v. 
United States,169 the Supreme Court explained: “When a 
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale 
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the 
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by 
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 
narrowest grounds . . . .”170 
Because Justice Kennedy claimed that he was deciding on 
narrower grounds than the plurality,171 most federal circuits 
interpret his concurrence as the opinion of the Court.172 Seven 
 
(arguing that a “fruits” test is “sound and workable”), with Oregon v. Elstad, 
470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985) (“[T]he Miranda presumption . . . does not require 
that the statements and their fruits be discarded as inherently tainted.”). 
Because this view is outside the scope of this Note, I will not discuss Justice 
Breyer’s concurrence in any more detail.  
 165. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 166. Id. at 622 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 167. See Rodriguez, supra note 38, at 1095 (describing confusion in circuit 
courts about the meaning of Seibert). 
 168. Id. at 1108.  
 169. 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
 170. Id. at 193. 
 171. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 622 (2004) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“In my view, [the plurality test] cuts too broadly . . . . I would 
apply a narrower test . . . .”).  
 172. See Reyes v. Lewis, 833 F.3d 1001, 1029 (9th Cir. 2016) (describing 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as “the clearly established rule under Seibert”); 
United States v. Moore, 670 F.3d 222, 230 (2d Cir. 2012) (using plurality 
factors to apply Justice Kennedy’s concurrence); United States v. Torres-Lona, 
491 F.3d 750, 758 (8th Cir. 2007) (applying Justice Kennedy’s concurrence); 
United States v. Courtney, 463 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2006) (same); United 
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circuit courts have adopted this view: the Second, Third, Fourth, 
Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh.173 Other circuit courts, 
however, observe that Justice Kennedy’s approach was 
specifically disavowed by nearly every other justice.174 The Sixth 
Circuit treats the plurality opinion as governing,175 while four 
other circuits—the First,  Seventh, Tenth, and D.C.—confusedly 
apply both opinions.176 This is a problem of some consequence, 
as the plurality and the concurrence tests can sometimes lead 
to divergent results.177  
Confusion about Seibert also abounds in state courts.178 The 
high courts of at least thirteen states and two U.S. territories 
 
States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1313 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Because Seibert is a 
plurality decision and Justice Kennedy concurred in the result on the 
narrowest grounds, it is his concurring opinion that provides the controlling 
law.”); United States v. Naranjo, 426 F.3d 221, 231–32 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion based on narrowest grounds doctrine); United 
States v. Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303, 309 (4th Cir. 2005) (applying Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence). 
 173. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 174. See, e.g., United States v. Heron, 564 F.3d 879, 885 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(“The only thing we know for sure is that at least seven members of the Court 
rejected an intent-based approach . . . .”). Justice Breyer was the sole member 
who voiced any measure of support for Justice Kennedy’s opinion. See Seibert, 
542 U.S. at 617 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“I also agree with Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion insofar as it . . . makes clear that a good-faith exception applies.”). 
 175. See United States v. Ray, 803 F.3d 244, 272 (6th Cir. 2015) (adopting 
plurality test). 
 176. See United States v. Faust, 853 F.3d 39, 48 n.6 (1st Cir. 2017) (noting 
that the First Circuit has previously applied both tests but has no “definitive 
reading”); United States v. Straker, 800 F.3d 570, 617 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(refusing to take a side in the Seibert debate before analyzing defendant’s 
claim with both tests); United States v. Lee, 618 F.3d 667, 678 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(noting that the circuit has not picked a test before applying both tests); United 
States v. Carrizales-Toledo, 454 F.3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006) (criticizing, 
strongly, other courts’ adoptions of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence before 
applying both tests). 
 177. See United States v. Sanchez-Gallegos, 412 F. App’x 58, 73 n.2 (10th 
Cir. 2011) (Ebels, J., concurring) (noting that the plurality approach might 
have yielded a different result than Justice Kennedy’s test). 
 178. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26–27, Johnson v. North 
Carolina, 140 S. Ct. 122 (2019) (No. 18-1542) (describing confusion in state 
and territorial courts). The author participated in researching and drafting 
this petition while he was a summer associate. 
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apply Justice Kennedy’s test.179 And the high courts of at least 
thirteen states and the District of Columbia apply the plurality 
opinion or apply both decisions.180 In states without a high court 
decision, intermediate appellate courts wade into the debate, 
 
 179. See Jackson v. State, 427 S.W.3d 607, 617 (Ark. 2013) (noting no 
evidence that failure to warn was “purposeful”); Verigan v. People, 420 P.3d 
247, 255 (Colo. 2018) (“We conclude that Justice Kennedy’s opinion . . . is the 
controlling law.”); Ross v. State, 45 So. 3d 403, 422 n.9 (Fla. 2010) (focusing on 
concurrence in analysis); State v. Abbott, 812 S.E.2d 225, 231 (Ga. 2018) 
(reversing its 2007 adoption of the Seibert plurality opinion); People v. Angoco, 
2007 Guam 1, 21 (2007) (concluding that “the concurrence of Justice Kennedy 
is the holding of Seibert”); State v. Wass, 396 P.3d 1243, 1248 (Idaho 2017) 
(adopting concurring opinion as the holding of Seibert); People v. Lopez, 892 
N.E.2d 1047, 1069 (Ill. 2008) (adopting concurrence); Jackson v. 
Commonwealth, 187 S.W.3d 300, 309 (Ky. 2006) (applying concurrence); State 
v. Nightingale, 58 A.3d 1057, 1067 (Me. 2012) (describing the circuit split 
before adopting concurrence); Robinson v. State, 19 A.3d 952, 964–65 (Md. 
2011) (applying concurrence); State v. Collings, 450 S.W.3d 741, 755 (Mo. 
2014) (“There was no . . . evidence demonstrating [the police chief] 
deliberately tried to skirt the protections of Miranda.”); State v. Ruiz, 179 A.3d 
333, 342 (N.H. 2018) (“[Justice Kennedy’s] narrower test controls under the 
Federal Constitution.”); El Pueblo de Puerto Rico v. Millán Pacheco, 182 
D.P.R. 595, 634–35 (P.R. 2011) (concluding that Seibert applies only to those 
cases in which the state deliberately subverts Miranda); Carter v. State, 309 
S.W.3d 31, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (adopting concurrence); Secret v. 
Commonwealth, 819 S.E.2d 234, 244 (Va. 2018) (same). 
 180. See People v. Krebs, 452 P.3d 609, 645–46 (Cal. 2019) (describing 
circuit split before applying both decisions); State v. Donald, 157 A.3d 1134, 
1143 n.8 (Conn. 2017) (“[W]e find the plurality’s approach more 
persuasive . . . .”); Hairston v. United States, 905 A.2d 765, 781–82 (D.C. 2006) 
(applying plurality); Sutherland v. State, No. 222, 2006, 2007 Del. LEXIS 582, 
at *5–6 (Del. Jan. 9, 2007) (applying plurality factors in unpublished decision); 
Kelly v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1045, 1054–55 (Ind. 2013) (applying plurality); 
State v. Jones, 151 P.3d 22, 35 (Kan. 2007) (listing plurality factors without 
mention of intent before concluding interrogation was not custodial); State v. 
Juranek, 844 N.W.2d 791, 803–04 (Neb. 2014) (applying plurality test); Carroll 
v. State, 371 P.3d 1023, 1034–35 (Nev. 2016) (same); State v. Filemon V., 412 
P.3d 1089, 1098–99 (N.M. 2018) (same); State v. Farris, 849 N.E.2d 985, 994 
(Ohio 2006) (“We agree with the Seibert plurality and dissent that the intent 
of the officer doing the questioning is not relevant in a Miranda analysis.”); 
State v. Sabourin, 161 A.3d 1132, 1141 (R.I. 2017) (listing plurality factors in 
dictum); State v. Navy, 688 S.E.2d 838, 842 (S.C. 2010) (“In our view, that 
deliberate [police] practice was not determinative in Seibert.”); State v. Dailey, 
273 S.W.3d 94, 107 (Tenn. 2009) (applying both tests); State v. Brooks, 70 A.3d 
1014, 1019–20 (Vt. 2013) (applying plurality test).  
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casting their lots with the plurality,181 the concurrence,182 or 
neither opinion.183 And at least two states, frustrated by the 
confusion in federal courts, turned to state constitutional 
privileges to avoid the fray altogether.184 Notwithstanding this 
state of affairs, the Supreme Court rejected several recent 
invitations to clarify the governing opinion.185  
 
2.  Both Opinions Focus on the Effectiveness of Miranda 
Warnings 
Given the uncertainty about the exact meaning of Seibert, 
it is important to carefully consider the tests set forth in both 
the plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. At 
root, what the opinions share in common is the idea that 
question-first interrogations violate Miranda because they 
 
 181. See Crawford v. State, 100 P.3d 440, 447–50 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004) 
(applying plurality factors after criticizing a subjective test); People v. Gamez, 
No. 324199, 2016 Mich. App. LEXIS 197, at *30–31 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 
2016) (analyzing Seibert issue using plurality factors). 
 182. See White v. State, 179 So. 3d 170, 191 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013) 
(adopting an Eleventh Circuit opinion which designated the concurrence as 
the governing opinion); State v. Zamora, 202 P.3d 528, 534–35 & n.8 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2009) (“We agree . . . that Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion is 
controlling . . . .”); State v. Bruce, 169 So. 3d 671, 678 (La. Ct. App. 2015) 
(“[T]he holding of Seibert is found in Justice Kennedy’s opinion concurring in 
judgment”); State v. Hickman, 238 P.3d 1240, 1244 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) 
(holding that the concurring opinion is the constitutional rule of Seibert). 
 183. See State v. Gomez, No. 2-123 / 11-0350, 2012 Iowa App. LEXIS 427, 
at *30 (Iowa Ct. App. June 13, 2012) (“Under any of the tests enunciated in 
Seibert, the admissions made on these occasions were admissible.”); see also 
Commonwealth v. Charleston, 16 A.3d 505, 525 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (finding 
that Seibert was not precedential because Justice Kennedy’s opinion was not 
a “logical subset” of the plurality opinion). 
 184. See State v. O’Neill, 936 A.2d 438, 454 (N.J. 2007) (“The shifting 
sands of federal jurisprudence provide no certainty concerning the 
standard . . . . Judges and police officers, however, must have workable 
standards . . . .”); see also State v. Vondehn, 236 P.3d 691, 702–04 (Or. 2010) 
(adopting plurality via parallel state constitutional grounds). 
 185. See generally State v. Wass, 396 P.3d 1243 (Idaho 2017), cert. denied, 
138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018); Johnson v. State, 821 S.E.2d 822 (N.C. 2018), cert. 
denied, 140 S. Ct. 122 (2019) (rejecting certiorari for two cases asking to clarify 
the Seibert opinion). 
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undermine the effectiveness of the warnings.186 But the opinions 
differ in their preferred method of assessing the harm to 
effectiveness.187 The plurality created an objective five-factor 
test centered on the suspect, urging consideration of (1) the 
completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the 
first round of interrogation; (2) the overlapping content of the 
two statements; (3) the timing and setting of the first and second 
statements; (4) the continuity of police personnel; and (5) the 
degree to which the interrogator’s questions treated the second 
round as a continuation of the first.188  
The plurality distilled its objective test from a factual 
comparison of the Seibert interrogation with the interrogation 
from Elstad.189 Because Elstad appeared to control the issue in 
the lower courts, the Supreme Court sought to distinguish it.190 
In Elstad, a young man made unwarned inculpatory statements 
to police officers in the living room of his parents’ house.191 He 
was arrested and transported to the sheriff’s department 
headquarters.192 Approximately an hour later, he waived his 
 
 186. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 611–12 (2004) (plurality 
opinion) (“The threshold issue when interrogators question first and warn 
later is thus whether it would be reasonable to find that in these circumstances 
the warnings could function ‘effectively’ as Miranda requires.”); id. at 620 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The police used a two-step questioning technique 
based on a deliberate violation of Miranda. The Miranda warning was 
withheld to obscure both the practical and legal significance of the admonition 
when finally given.”). 
 187. Compare id. at 615 (plurality opinion) (offering objective five-factor 
test to gauge effectiveness of Miranda warnings), with id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (asserting that deliberate violations accompanied by no “curative 
measures” should result in suppression). 
 188. See id. at 615–16 (plurality opinion) (listing five factors “that bear on 
whether Miranda warnings delivered midstream could be effective enough to 
accomplish their object”). 
 189. See id. at 615 (attributing five factors to “[t]he contrast between 
Elstad and this case”). 
 190. See State v. Seibert, No. 23729, 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 401, at *14–22 
(Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2002) (analyzing and applying Elstad as controlling 
precedent); see also supra Part I.D. 
 191. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 301 (1985) (describing facts). 
 192. Id.  
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Miranda rights and confessed to involvement in a burglary.193 
The Supreme Court held that the subsequent waiver was valid 
because it could not be the “fruit” of the unwarned 
statements.194 In so doing, the Elstad court also rejected the “cat 
out of the bag” theory accepted by the Oregon Court of 
Appeals.195 
The Seibert plurality distinguished Elstad using its 
five-factor test.196 In Elstad, the questioning in the suspect’s 
living room was “a markedly different experience” from the 
interrogation at the station house.197 Police had only gone to 
Elstad’s house in order to arrest him, and they had only elicited 
a “laconic” admission.198 Seibert, by contrast, presented a single 
“systematic, exhaustive” interrogation “managed with 
psychological skill.”199 There was no real distinction between the 
first and second interrogations of Patrice Seibert.200 Her sole 
respite between interrogations lasted only 15 to 20 minutes, and 
then the police conducted the second interrogation in the same 
exact place as the first.201 The same officer was present 
throughout both phases of questioning,202 and the warned 
portion of the interrogation specifically referred to the 
unwarned portion (“Now, in discussion you told us . . . there was 
 
 193. Id. at 301–02. 
 194. See id. at 305 (“Respondent’s contention that his confession . . . must 
be excluded as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ assumes the existence of a 
constitutional violation.”). 
 195. See id. at 302–03, 310–14 (noting procedural history and discussing 
the argument). 
 196. See Seibert, 542 U.S at 614–17 (comparing Elstad and Seibert before 
listing five-factor test). 
 197. Id. at 615. 
 198. Id. at 614. 
 199. Id. at 616. 
 200. See id. at 616–17 (“It would have been reasonable to regard the two 
sessions as part of a continuum . . . .”). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. Although not explicitly mentioned by the Seibert Court, this factor 
also appears in Elstad: the two officers who went to Elstad’s house also 
interrogated him at the station house. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 301–02 
(1985).  
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an understanding about Donald.”).203 Based on its analysis, the 
Seibert court concluded that the post-warning statements were 
inadmissible.204 
While the plurality’s test was objective and 
suspect-centered, Justice Kennedy’s test was subjective and 
officer-centered.205 Kennedy thought that the critical distinction 
in Elstad was the good faith of police officers.206 In his view, the 
Elstad Court refused to suppress the defendant’s confession 
because police mistakenly, rather than deliberately, withheld 
Miranda warnings.207 Justice Kennedy thought Seibert was 
distinguishable because there, police officers deliberately 
sought to violate Miranda.208 He concluded that only “deliberate 
violation[s]” of Miranda should be punished, because they 
“obscure both the practical and legal significance of the 
admonition when finally given.”209 In his view, statements 
obtained via the deliberate use of a two-step strategy should be 
suppressed absent “curative steps,” such as a substantial break 
in time and circumstances coupled with another Miranda 
warning, or an explanation that the earlier unwarned statement 
cannot be used.210 
 
 203. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 616–17 (2004). 
 204. Id. at 617. 
 205. See id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“I would apply a narrower 
test applicable only in the infrequent case, such as we have here, in which the 
two-step interrogation technique was used in a calculated way to undermine 
the Miranda warning.”). 
 206. Id. 
 207. See id. at 619 (“The suspect had not received a Miranda warning 
before making the statement, apparently because it was not clear whether the 
suspect was in custody at the time.”). The plurality also read Elstad as relating 
to good-faith Miranda mistakes, but did not limit question-first interrogations 
to cases involving a deliberate failure to warn. See id. at 615 (plurality opinion) 
(“[I]t is fair to read Elstad . . . as a good-faith Miranda mistake . . . posing no 
threat to warn-first practice generally”). 
 208. See id. at 620 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“This case presents different 
considerations. The police used a two-step questioning technique based on a 
deliberate violation of Miranda.”). 
 209. Id.  
 210. Id. at 622. 
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3.  Justice Kennedy’s Concurring Opinion Is Not the 
“Narrowest” 
Although a majority of federal circuit courts have adopted 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion, the narrowest grounds doctrine does 
not compel them to do so.211 Because the Supreme Court in 
Marks never explained how courts should decide which opinion 
is the “narrowest,” lower courts have applied at least three 
different approaches.212 The “implicit consensus” approach 
labels a decision as narrow and therefore controlling if it is a 
“logical subset” of other, broader opinions.213 The “fifth vote” 
approach considers which opinion was critical in securing a 
majority judgment.214 Finally, the “issue by issue” approach 
“counts noses” to determine if five justices (including from the 
dissents) agree on a given legal question.215 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion is not the “narrowest” under two 
out of three approaches.216 Only by resorting to a high level of 
generality could Justice Kennedy’s opinion be described as a 
 
 211. See United States v. Heron, 654 F.3d 879, 884–85 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(“Although Justice Kennedy provided the crucial fifth vote for the majority, we 
find it a strain at best to view his concurrence taken as a whole as the 
narrowest ground on which a majority of the Court could agree.”). But see 
United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 2006) (concluding 
that Justice Kennedy’s opinion was the narrowest under Marks because it was 
a “logical subset” of the plurality opinion). 
 212. See Ryan C. Williams, Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and 
Precedential Constraint, 69 STAN. L. REV. 795, 806–19 (2017) (recording three 
different approaches taken by lower courts in response to Marks’ scant 
guidance). 
 213. See King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc) 
(“[O]ne opinion can be meaningfully regarded as ‘narrower’ than another—
only when one opinion is a logical subset of other, broader opinions.”).  
 214. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 694 n.7 (3d 
Cir. 1991), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
(directing lower courts to treat as controlling “the opinion of the Justice or 
Justices who concurred on the narrowest grounds necessary to secure a 
majority”).  
 215. See United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 182 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(permitting the counting of dissenting votes if those votes “establish a majority 
on the relevant issue”). 
 216. See Williams, supra note 212, at 808–19 (describing three 
approaches). 
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“logical subset” of the plurality opinion.217 After all, the plurality 
explicitly rejected Justice Kennedy’s view that only deliberate 
question-first interrogations should result in exclusion.218 
Counting noses with the “issue by issue” approach yields the 
same conclusion, because seven justices agreed that examining 
subjective intent was the wrong approach.219 The most plausible 
argument for Justice Kennedy’s opinion to be controlling under 
Marks is via the “fifth vote” approach.220 However, that 
approach is controversial because—as it did in Seibert—it can 
assign precedential weight to the opinion of a single justice.221 
Even if Justice Kennedy’s opinion can be designated as the 
“narrowest,” the Marks doctrine has been harshly criticized by 
jurists222 and academics223 alike. In 2018, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari on a case that questioned the continued 
viability of Marks.224 Although the justices signaled 
 
 217. See Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks Rule, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 
1983 (2019) (explaining that “endorsement of a ‘broader’ proposition does not 
necessarily or logically entail an implicit endorsement of any ‘narrower’ 
proposition”); see also United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014, 1021 (9th Cir. 
2016) (criticizing and overruling an overly-general “results-based” approach to 
the “implicit consensus” theory). 
 218. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 616 n.6 (2004) (plurality opinion) 
(“Because the intent of the officer will rarely be as candidly admitted as it was 
here (even as it is likely to determine the conduct of the interrogation), the 
focus is on facts apart from intent . . . .”). 
 219. See id. (rejecting consideration of officer intent); id. at 624 (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting) (“The plurality’s rejection of an intent-based test is also, in my 
view, correct.”).  
 220. See id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (providing the fifth vote for a 
majority judgment). 
 221. See Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1360 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(calling it an “anomaly” when “the views of one justice” become “the law of the 
land”). 
 222. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (recording that 
Marks rule in Bakke “so obviously baffled and divided the lower courts that 
have considered it”); Davis, 825 F.3d at 1020 (“In the nearly forty years since 
Marks, lower courts have struggled to divine what the Supreme Court meant 
by ‘the narrowest grounds.’”). 
 223. See Re, supra note 217, at 1944–47 (arguing that Marks is “wrong, 
root and stem”); Williams, supra note 212, at 822 (asserting that the Supreme 
Court is as divided as lower courts on the proper application of the Marks rule). 
 224. Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1771–72 (2018). 
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dissatisfaction with the narrowest grounds doctrine at oral 
arguments,225 they ultimately left Marks undisturbed.226 
Perhaps it was for the same reason that Justice Breyer 
indicated: “If you ask me to write something better than Marks, 
I don’t know what to say.”227 
Because the Marks narrowest grounds doctrine does not 
require the adoption of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, and because 
the continued vitality of Marks is in question, it is appropriate 
to consider which opinion is better suited to assessing the 
effectiveness of Miranda warnings in a question-first 
interrogation. 
4.  The Plurality Opinion Better Assesses the Effectiveness of 
Miranda Warnings 
Justice Kennedy’s subjective approach is commendable for 
its theoretical simplicity. That quest for simplicity appears to 
have motivated his concurring opinion.228 Justice Kennedy 
wrote: “Miranda’s clarity is one of its strengths, and a 
multifactor test that applies to every two-stage interrogation 
may serve to undermine that clarity.”229 Justice Kennedy’s 
approach also adopts an eminently pragmatic view230 of law 
enforcement which makes room for fallible officers to make 
mistakes while engaged in the “often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime.”231 
 
 225. See Justin Marceau, Argument Analysis: “We Know How to Get to 
Five,” SCOTUSBLOG, https://perma.cc/Q46K-U5LK (last visited Oct. 18, 2020) 
(recording that “several justices and the attorneys seemed frustrated with the 
imperfect set of options” regarding the Marks rule). 
 226. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1772 (deciding the case on its sentencing merits 
despite “extensive briefing and careful arguments” about Marks). 
 227. Marceau, supra note 225. 
 228. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (criticizing 
plurality opinion because a multifactor test “undermine[s] [Miranda’s] 
clarity”). 
 229. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 622 (2004). 
 230. See id. at 620 (praising Elstad for its “balanced and pragmatic 
approach to enforcement of the Miranda warning”). 
 231. See Johnson v. North Carolina, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (coining 
“competitive enterprise” phrase). 
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 But there are two immediately apparent problems with the 
good-faith approach. First, although the good-faith approach is 
simple in theory, it forces courts to plumb the subjective intent 
of police officers, which will rarely be as easy as it was in 
Seibert.232 As Justice O’Connor noted in dissent: “[F]ocusing 
constitutional analysis on a police officer’s subjective intent [is] 
an unattractive proposition that we all but uniformly avoid.”233 
This is why the Supreme Court has declined to consider 
subjective officer intent in other areas of criminal procedure.234  
The second problem with the good-faith test is that the 
officer’s intent has no measurable effect on the experience of the 
suspect.235 For example, if police officers withheld Miranda 
warnings during the first portion of Seibert’s interrogation out 
of forgetfulness, poor training, or fatigue, Patrice Seibert would 
likely have still understood the interrogation in the same exact 
way.236 If Justice Kennedy’s primary concern was with 
“obscur[ing] the practical and legal significance” of Miranda 
warnings, how does that change when the obfuscation is 
unintentional?237  
 
 232. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616 n.6 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he intent of 
the officer will rarely be as candidly admitted as it was here . . . .”). 
 233. See id. at 625–26 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (agreeing with plurality’s 
rejection of subjective intent consideration).  
 234. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 737 (2011) (noting that the 
Supreme Court has “almost uniformly rejected invitations to probe subjective 
intent” in the Fourth Amendment context); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 
806, 812–13 (1996) (rejecting consideration of officer intent in pretextual 
traffic stops); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990) (“[E]venhanded 
law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards of 
conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind 
of the officer.”). 
 235. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 624 (“Thoughts kept inside a police officer’s 
head cannot affect [the suspect’s] experience [of interrogation].”). 
 236. See id. at 625 (“A suspect who experienced exactly the same 
interrogation as Seibert, save for a difference in the undivulged, subjective 
intent of the interrogating officer . . . would not experience the interrogation 
any differently.”). 
 237. See id. at 620 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The Miranda warning was 
withheld to obscure both the practical and legal significance of the admonition 
when finally given.”). 
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By contrast, the plurality opinion is purely concerned with 
objective factors which undermine the effectiveness of Miranda 
warnings.238 As a result, it avoids both of the pitfalls of Justice 
Kennedy’s approach. In practical terms, the plurality test 
permits courts to consider the conduct of both the interrogators 
and the suspect, rather than having to assess the inner thoughts 
of police officers.239 By training the five-factor test on the 
suspect’s receipt of Miranda warnings, the Seibert plurality 
creates a more appropriate framework for assessing their 
effectiveness.240 
5.  The Seibert Court Identified Three Specific Dangers of 
Question-First Interrogations 
Although both the objective plurality test and the subjective 
good-faith concurrence differ in their approaches, both opinions 
concluded that the question-first interrogation in Seibert 
violated Miranda because it undermined the effectiveness of the 
warnings.241 Together, the opinions highlight three specific and 
interrelated threats created by question-first interrogations.  
The first threat identified in Seibert is timing: by waiting 
for a “particularly opportune time to give [warnings],” 
interrogators can reduce or eliminate their effectiveness.242 
Delayed warnings seem to lack any independent meaning: if a 
suspect talks to police for hours, how could he think that “he had 
a genuine right to remain silent, let alone persist in so believing 
 
 238. Id. at 615–16 (plurality opinion). 
 239. See id. at 625–26 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (describing the 
“unattractive proposition” of divining officer intent). 
 240. See id. at 615–16 (plurality opinion) (centering inquiry on suspect’s 
experience of Miranda warnings). 
 241. See id. at 611 (“The object of question-first is to render Miranda 
warnings ineffective by waiting for a particularly opportune time to give them, 
after the suspect has already confessed.”); id. at 621 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“The technique used in this case distorts the meaning of Miranda . . . . The 
Miranda rule would be frustrated were we to allow police to undermine its 
meaning and effect.” (emphasis added)). 
 242. See id. at 611 (plurality opinion) (describing timing problem).  
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once the police began to lead him over the same ground 
again?”243  
Second, delayed warnings actively imbalance and confuse 
suspects. Sudden effusions of legalese partway through an 
interrogation can cause “perplexity” or “bewilderment.”244 This 
threat might be called “Miranda as a sword,” because the use of 
the Miranda warnings serves to intimidate or rattle a suspect 
rather than to soberly advise the suspect of her rights.245 It 
would indicate that things have gotten serious—that we were 
just talking before, but now you are in real trouble and you have 
the right to remain silent and anything you say can and will be 
used against you in a court of law, and you have the right to an 
attorney, but if you cannot afford one, one will be appointed for 
you, and if you understand these rights and wish to waive them, 
sign right here. As the Seibert plurality noted, a midstream 
recitation of Miranda actually suggests the opposite of what it 
is intended to achieve: “[T]elling a suspect that ‘anything you 
say can and will be used against you,’ without specifically 
excepting the statement just given, could lead to an entirely 
reasonable inference that what he has just said will be used, 
with subsequent silence being of no avail.”246 This formulation 
of Miranda is not a warning. It is a forceful shove at the edge of 
a cliff. 
Finally, there is the “cat out of the bag” problem: suspects 
who implicate themselves in the unwarned portions of the 
interview will be unlikely to think that they can actually remain 
silent.247 Not knowing that their earlier confession is 
 
 243. Id.  
 244. See id. (discussing likely reactions of interrogated suspects). 
 245. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Johnson v. North Carolina, 
140 S. Ct. 122 (2019) (No. 18-1542) (“By strategically timing the formal arrest 
almost five hours into their interrogation, the detectives transformed Miranda 
from a shield into a sword.”). 
 246. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 613 (2004). 
 247. See id. (“Upon hearing warnings only in the aftermath of 
interrogation and just after making a confession, a suspect would hardly think 
that he had a genuine right to remain silent . . . .”); see also id. at 620 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The strategy is based on the assumption that 
Miranda warnings will tend to mean less when recited midinterrogation, after 
inculpatory statements have already been obtained.”). 
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inadmissible, they are likely to waive their rights and 
incriminate themselves again after receiving Miranda 
warnings.248 This argument was flatly rejected in Elstad.249 The 
Elstad Court called the argument “speculative and attenuated,” 
because it required the Court to assume that the warned 
admission emerged from the unwarned confession.250 To the 
extent that such a psychological “cat out of the bag” effect 
existed, the Court refused to “endow . . . the psychological 
effects of voluntary unwarned admissions with constitutional 
implications . . . .”251  
But both the plurality and the concurrence in Seibert 
resuscitated the argument, at least as far as question-first 
interrogations are concerned.252 Justice Souter limited Elstad’s 
rejection of “cat out of the bag” to apply only “on the facts of that 
case”: “Elstad rejected the ‘cat out of the bag’ theory that any 
short, earlier admission, obtained in arguably innocent neglect 
of Miranda, determined the character of the later, warned 
confession.”253 Justice Souter continued that Elstad only 
rejected “cat out the bag” for situations involving a “good faith 
Miranda mistake” which posed “no threat to warn-first practice 
generally.”254  
With the Elstad obstacle cleared, Justice Souter identified 
“cat out of the bag” as a threat created by question-first 
interrogations.255 He noted, “[W]ith one confession in hand 
before the warnings, the interrogator can count on getting its 
 
 248. See id. at 622 (suggesting that officers could explain the likely 
inadmissibility of a prewarning custodial statement in order to cure a 
deliberate question-first interrogation). 
 249. See id. at 627 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“We rejected [the cat out of 
the bag theory] outright.”). 
 250. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 313 (1985). 
 251. Id. at 311. 
 252. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 627–28 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (accusing 
the plurality of ignoring Elstad’s outright rejection of the “cat out of the bag” 
argument). 
 253. Id. at 615 (plurality opinion). 
 254. Id. 
 255. See id. at 613, 617 (asserting that Miranda warnings will become less 
effective after a suspect makes inculpatory statements). 
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duplicate, with trifling additional trouble.”256 Justice Souter 
continued: “Upon hearing warnings . . . just after making a 
confession, a suspect would hardly think he had a genuine right 
to remain silent . . . .”257 If a suspect previously made an 
inculpatory statement during a question-first interrogation, it 
would be “unnatural to refuse to repeat at the second stage what 
had been said before.”258 
Although Justice Kennedy’s short concurrence engaged the 
“cat out of the bag” argument less explicitly, he too 
characterized Elstad as a case about good-faith neglect, rather 
than deliberate subversion, of Miranda.259 Justice Kennedy 
agreed with the plurality that “Miranda warnings will tend to 
mean less when recited midinterrogation, after inculpatory 
statements have already been obtained.”260 As a result, a 
majority of the Seibert Court recognized “cat out the bag” as a 
specific danger created by question-first interrogations. 261 
6.  Two Rationales Motivated the Seibert Court’s Disapproval 
of Question-First Interrogations 
Setting aside the specific threats created by question-first 
interrogations, the Supreme Court in Seibert appeared to be 
motivated by two general rationales: disapproval of police 
gamesmanship and concern about the risk of false confessions. 
The first apparent rationale is the Court’s disapproval of 
gamesmanship. Fighting crime is a “competitive enterprise.”262 
As with any competition, the participants often stretch the rules 
 
 256. Id. at 613. 
 257. Id. (emphasis added). 
 258. Id. at 617. 
 259. See id. at 619–20 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (limiting Elstad to factual 
circumstances suggestive of good faith by the police in that case). 
 260. Id. at 620 (emphasis added). 
 261. See id. at 604 (plurality opinion) (noting that four Justices joined the 
plurality); id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (adding one Justice). 
 262. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (calling law 
enforcement “the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”). 
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as far as possible in order to gain an advantage.263 This 
sometimes means that police manipulate Supreme Court 
precedents to comply with the letter of the law while evading its 
spirit.264 In Seibert, the Court pushed back against 
gamesmanship that went too far.265 By implementing 
question-first techniques, the police treated the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Elstad as an open invitation to violate 
Miranda.266 In response, the Seibert Court decried a “police 
strategy adapted to undermine the Miranda warnings,”267 and 
urged: “Strategists dedicated to draining the substance out of 
Miranda cannot accomplish by training instructions what 
Dickerson held Congress could not do by statute.”268 The Court 
added that police could not make an “end run” around 
Miranda.269  
Gamesmanship may have been an especially compelling 
rationale for the Supreme Court in light of the history of 
Miranda.270 Although law enforcement agencies protested in the 
wake of Miranda,271 they very quickly adapted to the new 
 
 263. See Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern 
Interrogators’ Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 
MINN. L. REV. 397, 407–08 (1999) (discussing police adaptations to Miranda). 
 264. See Weisselberg, supra note 147, at 1122 (describing police training 
which circumvented Miranda by treating it as a “weak rule of evidence” rather 
than a “constitutional command”).  
 265. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 604 (2004) (holding that 
statements elicited from “midstream recitation of warnings” were 
inadmissible). 
 266. See id. at 609–11 (discussing prevalence of police training practices 
distilled from Elstad); see also State v. Batts, 195 P.3d 144, 156 (Ala. Ct. App. 
2008) (explaining that question-first interrogations were an effort to “take 
advantage” of Elstad). 
 267. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616. 
 268. Id. at 617. 
 269. See id. at 606 (using “end run” language from lower courts). 
 270. See Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure to Restrain Pernicious 
Interrogation Practices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211, 1217 (2001) (explaining the 
Supreme Court’s failure post-Miranda to restrict police adaptations to the 
decision). 
 271. See LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 176 (1983) 
(quoting the Philadelphia police commissioner as stating, “I do not believe the 
Constitution was designed as a shield for criminals.”). 
 
488 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 451 (2021) 
 
playing field.272 For example, the Reid Technique—a 
widely-used interrogation training program cited extensively in 
Miranda—was updated to account for developments in the 
law.273 The legal section of a Reid Technique workbook, 
published in 1989, offered “[c]ommon [m]isconceptions” about 
Miranda, an article from law professor Fred Inbau about the 
“[l]aw on [c]riminal [i]nterrogation,” and an advertisement for a 
legal periodical for law enforcement agencies.274 
Of course, there is nothing wrong with the police knowing 
the law.275 But after Miranda, police departments developed 
techniques designed specifically to reduce the effectiveness of 
the warnings.276 Richard A. Leo, an expert on police 
interrogation, noted that police learned to neutrally deliver 
warnings,277 downplay their significance,278 and offer benefits in 
exchange for waivers of rights.279 Some departments even began 
questioning “outside Miranda,” telling suspects that their 
statements could not be used against them or were “off the 
record,” and then obtaining incriminating statements for use in 
subsequent impeachment.280 
 
 272. See Leo & White, supra note 263, at 408 (“[D]uring the three decades 
following Miranda, interrogators have become even more sophisticated in 
overcoming the obstacles to a successful interrogation.”). 
 273. JOHN E. REID & ASSOCS., INC., THE REID TECHNIQUE OF INTERVIEWING 
AND INTERROGATION: LEGAL SECTION 1–17 (1989). 
 274. Id. 
 275. See Malcolmson v. Gibbons, 23 N.W. 166, 168 (Mich. 1885) (“An officer 
of justice is bound to know what the law is . . . .”).  
 276. See Leo & White, supra note 263, at 431–70 (discussing police 
adaptations to Miranda and its progeny). 
 277. Id. at 432–33. 
 278. Id. at 433–39. 
 279. Id. at 440–47. 
 280. See id. at 460–61 (describing “questioning ‘outside Miranda’”). This 
particular technique was a response to the Harris decision, which permitted 
testimony taken in violation of Miranda to be used for impeachment purposes. 
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971). 
 
“NO EARLIER CONFESSION”  489 
 
Although the Court in Seibert was arguably less committed 
to Miranda than the Warren Court,281 it was still not prepared 
to permit the blatant tactics of the Rolla, Missouri police 
department.282 Previous innovations in interrogations toed the 
line, but question-first interrogations simply went too far.283 In 
Seibert, the police attempted to deprive the defendant of a right 
guaranteed to her by the Miranda decision.284 Miranda was 
intended to enable a “free and rational” choice before 
self-incrimination, but question-first interrogations had exactly 
the opposite purpose: to undermine that “free and rational 
choice.”285 
The second rationale is the prevention of false 
confessions.286 Interestingly, this rationale never appears 
explicitly in any of the Seibert opinions.287 Nor was the subject 
raised directly by the parties or the various amici.288 The 
omission in briefs is curious, and might reflect a lessened public 
awareness about false confessions at the time that Seibert was 
 
 281. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 644 (2004) (permitting the 
use of physical evidence obtained from Miranda violations on the same day 
that the Court decided Seibert). 
 282. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 604 (2004). 
 283. Compare id. at 617 (rejecting question-first interrogation practices 
because they make Miranda warnings ineffective), with id. at 609 (calling 
police-obtained waivers of Miranda rights a “virtual ticket of admissibility”). 
 284. See id. at 617 (“[T]he question-first tactic effectively threatens to 
thwart Miranda’s purpose of reducing the risk that a coerced confession would 
be admitted . . . .”). 
 285. Id. at 611. 
 286. See Kassin, supra note 70, at 219–22 (discussing psychological 
research on false confessions in police interrogation context); Joshua M. 
Stewart et al., The Prevalence of False Confessions in Experimental Laboratory 
Simulations, 36 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 12, 22 (2018) (finding in meta-analysis of 
experimental simulations that 47 percent of study participants could be 
induced to falsely confess). 
 287. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604–17 (omitting mention of false 
confessions). 
 288. See Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondent at 18 n.5, Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (No. 
02-1371) (mentioning false confessions solely in an amicus brief citation to a 
newspaper article). 
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argued and decided.289 The Supreme Court, however, was 
certainly aware of the phenomenon: as far back as the 1960s, 
the Miranda decision—reaffirmed extensively by the plurality 
and concurring opinions in Seibert290—stated that even in the 
absence of physical coercion, overly-aggressive police tactics 
could “give rise to a false confession.”291 And only a few years 
after Seibert was decided, the Supreme Court admitted frankly 
that “there is mounting empirical evidence that [interrogation] 
pressures can induce a frighteningly high percentage of people 
to confess to crimes they never committed.”292  
Whether question-first interrogation practices really do 
increase the risk of false confessions is unclear.293 Based on the 
logic of Seibert, however, the more that the Miranda warnings 
are obscured, the more unlikely it is that a suspect will perceive 
a choice to invoke her rights to silence or counsel.294 As a result, 
a suspect will remain in the psychologically coercive, 
 
 289. But see Saul Kassin, False Confessions and the Jogger Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2002, at A31 (discussing false confessions in 2002 op-ed about 
the Central Park Four). 
 290. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 608–09 (explaining constitutional importance 
of Miranda); id. at 621 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The technique used in this 
case distorts the meaning of Miranda and furthers no legitimate 
countervailing interest.”). 
 291. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 & n.24 (1966). 
 292. Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 321 (2009). 
 293. But see RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN 
JUSTICE 278–83 (2008) (using empirical studies to argue that the Miranda 
doctrine generally has had little to no success in stemming the problem of false 
confessions); Kassin, supra note 70, at 218 (finding that innocent suspects 
were more likely to waive Miranda rights); Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance 
of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1092–94 (2010) (noting that 40 
exonerated defendants had all waived their Miranda rights, and arguing that 
Miranda is often an obstacle to challenging false confessions). Although these 
discussions undermine the false confession rationale somewhat, empirical 
studies of Miranda are notoriously difficult to undertake. For example, it is 
probably impossible to quantify how many false confessions were avoided 
because suspects invoked their rights after warnings. 
 294. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 617 (2004) (noting that a person 
subjected to question-first interrogation would not have understood “that she 
retained a choice about continuing to talk”). 
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“police-dominated atmosphere,” increasing the chances of a 
false confession.295 
B.  Bobby v. Dixon 
Since Seibert was decided in 2004, the Supreme Court has 
only substantively296 applied it in a single case, Bobby v. 
Dixon.297 The defendant, Archie Dixon, murdered a man in order 
to steal his car.298 While investigating the murder, police spoke 
to Dixon on three occasions.299 On the first occasion—a chance 
encounter—they spoke to him while he was at the police station 
(Dixon’s car had been impounded).300 Police advised Dixon of his 
Miranda rights, and he declined to be interviewed without a 
lawyer present.301  
Next, detectives arrested Dixon for forging the victim’s 
signature on a check and questioned him intermittently for 
about forty-five minutes out of a three-hour span.302 They 
deliberately did not advise him of his Miranda rights because 
they were worried that he would refuse to speak to them 
again.303 Dixon implicated himself in the forgery by admitting 
that he had signed the check, but denied any knowledge of the 
murder victim’s disappearance.304  
 
 295. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445 (attributing self-incrimination to 
“police-dominated atmosphere”). 
 296. A few Supreme Court cases cite to Seibert outside of the question-first 
context. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 647 (2004) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (citing Seibert in dissent to protest narrowing of Miranda 
exclusionary doctrine); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 286 (2011) 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (using Seibert to praise clarity of the Miranda rule).  
 297. Dixon, 565 U.S. at 30–32. 
 298. Id. at 24. 
 299. Id. at 25. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. at 25–26. 
 303. See id. at 25 (“Prior to the interrogation, the detectives had decided 
not to provide Dixon with Miranda warnings for fear that Dixon would again 
refuse to speak with them.”). 
 304. Id. at 25–26. 
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Four hours later, Dixon was interrogated again.305 This 
time, police told Dixon that his co-conspirator had led them to 
the body.306 Dixon signed a waiver of rights and spoke to police 
for about half an hour.307 The police obtained a tape recorder, 
and then advised him of his rights again.308 During this second 
portion of the interrogation, Dixon admitted to murdering the 
victim.309 
At trial, Dixon’s confession to murder was excluded.310 The 
Ohio courts reversed, concluding that the confession was 
admissible because Dixon received Miranda warnings.311 Dixon 
was convicted of murder and a host of other charges, and was 
sentenced to death.312 On collateral appeal, the Sixth Circuit 
issued a writ of habeas corpus.313 In part, the Sixth Circuit 
concluded that Dixon’s confession to murder was the product of 
a “two-step interrogation” under the recently decided Seibert 
case.314 In so ruling, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the 
relevant interrogations were the interrogation after Dixon was 
arrested for forgery (and suspected in the disappearance of the 
victim), and the interrogation that occurred four hours later 
after police discovered the victim’s body.315 In a tortured, 
one-paragraph analysis, the Sixth Circuit mangled both Elstad 
and Seibert.316 It offered a brief, generalized discussion of the 
 
 305. Id. at 26. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id.  
 310. See id. (“At Dixon’s trial, the Ohio trial court excluded both Dixon’s 
initial confession to forgery and his later confession to murder.”). 
 311. See id. at 27 (noting that Ohio Court of Appeals reversed suppression 
of murder confession during interlocutory appeal); State v. Dixon, 656 N.E.2d 
1, 5 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (permitting the use of the confession under Elstad); 
State v. Dixon, 805 N.E.2d 1042, 1049–52 (Ohio 2004) (same). 
 312. Bobby v. Dixon, 565 U.S. 23, 27 (2011). 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. at 30. 
 315. See Dixon v. Houk, 627 F.3d 553, 555–56 (6th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub 
nom. Bobby v. Dixon, 565 U.S. 23 (2011). 
 316. See id. (describing Elstad and Seibert). 
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rule from Seibert, applied neither the concurrence nor the 
plurality tests, and then flatly concluded: “Elstad itself is clear, 
and Seibert simply reinforced its meaning.”317 
The Supreme Court, writing per curiam, reversed.318 It 
distinguished Seibert, concluding that Dixon had not been 
subjected to a two-step interrogation.319 The analysis primarily 
involved the plurality opinion from Seibert, but also included 
scattered quotes from Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.320 
Seemingly applying the objective plurality test, the Court 
appeared to consider only the second, third, and fifth factors: the 
overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and 
setting of the first and second interrogations, and the 
interrogators’ treatment of the second interrogation as 
continuous with the first.321 Applying the second factor, there 
was no “overlapping content of the two statements.”322 In 
Dixon’s first interrogation, he flatly denied involvement in the 
victim’s disappearance.323 By contrast, he confessed to murder 
in his second interrogation.324 Turning to the third factor, the 
“timing and setting” also militated against a question-first 
interrogation.325 There were four hours between the 
interrogations, and in that time Dixon was transported back to 
jail and then back to the police station.326 He may have also 
 
 317. Id. at 557. 
 318. Dixon, 565 U.S. at 24. 
 319. See id. at 31–32 (distinguishing Seibert). 
 320. See id. (quoting both plurality and concurring opinions from Seibert). 
 321. See id. (considering overlapping content, timing and setting, and 
interrogator treatment of the second interrogation as continuous with the first 
without explicitly referring to the test). 
 322. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 615 (2004). 
 323. See Bobby v. Dixon, 565 U.S. 23, 26 (2011) (“[I]n this case Dixon 
steadfastly maintained . . . that he had ‘nothing whatsoever’ to do with 
Hammer’s disappearance.”). 
 324. See id. (“Indeed, Dixon contradicted his prior unwarned statements 
when he confessed to Hammer’s murder.”). 
 325. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615. 
 326. See Dixon, 565 U.S. at 31–32  
Four hours passed between Dixon’s unwarned interrogation and his 
receipt of Miranda rights, during which time he traveled from the 
police station to a separate jail and back again; claimed to have 
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spoken with his lawyer during that time.327 Finally, the Court 
applied the fifth factor to find that the interrogators’ questions 
had not treated the second round as continuous with the first.328 
The detectives who questioned Dixon neither referred to nor 
leveraged anything produced in the first interview.329 As the 
Supreme Court noted: “Nor is there any evidence that police 
used Dixon’s earlier admission to forgery to induce him to waive 
his right to silence later: Dixon declared his desire to tell police 
what happened . . . before the second interrogation session even 
began.”330 
Although the Court did not explicitly consider the 
plurality’s two other factors, it is possible to apply those factors 
as well. 331 The first factor (completeness and detail of the 
questions and answers) is neutral. Although the questions 
asked in both interviews overlapped,332 the answers did not.333 
The fourth factor (continuity of police personnel) is 
inconclusive.334 One of the detectives present at the second 
interview had also been present at the first interview, but the 
other one had not.335  
 
spoken to his lawyer; and learned that police were talking to his 
accomplice and had found [the victim’s] body. 
 327. See id. (noting that Dixon claimed to have spoken to his lawyer before 
the second, warned interrogation). 
 328. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615. 
 329. Dixon, 565 U.S. at 31. 
 330. Id. 
 331. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615 (listing the first and fourth factors, which 
were not discussed in Dixon). 
 332. State v. Dixon, 805 N.E.2d 1042, 1049 (Ohio 2004) (noting that “[t]he 
police were focused primarily on Hammer’s disappearance” during the first 
interview). 
 333. See Dixon, 565 U.S. at 31 (noting that Dixon denied involvement in 
the first interview, but confessed to murder in the second interview). 
 334. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 615 (2004) (describing fourth 
plurality factor). 
 335. See Dixon, 805 N.E.2d at 1049 (listing Detectives Snow and Kulakoski 
as the interviewing officers at the first interview, and Detectives Kulakoski 
and Leiter at the second). 
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Interestingly, the Dixon Court offered little in the way of 
analysis applying Justice Kennedy’s good-faith concurrence.336 
Although it dutifully noted that Justice Kennedy offered a 
“narrower test,” the decision did not appear to apply that test in 
considering whether police deliberately deprived Dixon of his 
Miranda rights.337 Perhaps it was unnecessary to consider, 
because the police quite clearly had done so in the second 
interview.338 Despite this, Justice Kennedy would likely have 
been satisfied by the subsequent “curative measures”: a 
“substantial break in time and circumstances” between the 
prewarning statement and the Miranda warning.339  
Although the Dixon court never clarified which opinion it 
considered governing, it was quite clear under either test that 
Dixon was never deprived of an effective Miranda warning as 
Seibert contemplated.340 Because this case was a fact-laden, per 
curiam decision, Dixon has not generally been regarded as a sea 
change (or really any change) in Miranda jurisprudence.341  
A single line in Dixon, however, has proved troublesome. 
Nested among its rapid reversal of the Sixth Circuit opinion, the 
Supreme Court distinguished Seibert by writing, “[U]nlike in 
Seibert, there is no concern here that police gave Dixon Miranda 
 
 336. See Bobby v. Dixon, 565 U.S. 23, 30–33 (2011) (omitting any detailed 
discussion of police intent).  
 337. See id. at 30–31 (registering Kennedy’s “narrower test,” but not 
seeming to apply it). 
 338. See Dixon, 805 N.E.2d at 1049 (“Kulakoski, after consulting with 
Snow, decided not to advise Dixon of his Miranda rights because the detectives 
believed that Dixon would invoke his right to counsel if he were issued 
Miranda warnings.”). 
 339. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[A] 
substantial break in time and circumstances between the prewarning 
statement and the Miranda warning may suffice in most circumstances, as it 
allows the accused to distinguish the two contexts and appreciate that the 
interrogation has taken a new turn.”). 
 340. Of course, under Justice Kennedy’s good-faith test, the effectiveness 
would have resulted from “curative measures.” Id. 
 341. See Madhavi M. McCall et al., Criminal Justice and the 2011–2012 
United States Supreme Court Term, 14 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 239, 250 n.63 
(2013) (omitting any discussion of Bobby v. Dixon and seven other per curium 
criminal justice decisions). 
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warnings and then led him to repeat an earlier murder 
confession, because there was no earlier confession to repeat.”342  
1.  “No Earlier Confession to Repeat” in Lower Courts 
Since Dixon was decided in 2011, a number of lower courts 
have started treating this offhand sentence (“no earlier 
confession to repeat”) as a per se rule that limits the application 
of Seibert to cases involving an unwarned confession.343 
According to this reading of Dixon, if the suspect fails to make a 
confession during the unwarned portion of a question-first 
interrogation, then Seibert does not apply.344 
This reading of a single line from Dixon is very interesting. 
It might suggest that lower courts are attempting to avoid the 
confusing Seibert decision.345 Given the ongoing circuit split 
about the governing opinion in Seibert, courts might be trying 
to resort to a “quick fix” rather than wade into the furor about 
the narrowest grounds doctrine.346 This thesis would be 
particularly plausible if all of the courts categorically applying 
Dixon came from jurisdictions which had not adopted a 
governing Seibert opinion.347 But this is not the case: some 
courts that apply the line from Dixon come from jurisdictions 
 
 342. Dixon, 565 U.S. at 31. 
 343. See, e.g., Currie v. Graham, 17-cv-1227, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98796, 
at *8–9 (E.D.N.Y. June 12, 2019) (describing Dixon’s holding as permitting 
non-incriminatory statements, compared to Seibert’s “getting a suspect to 
confess before warnings”). 
 344. See State v. Clifton, 892 N.W.2d 112, 131 (Neb. 2017) (“[E]ssential to 
a Miranda violation under Seibert is an inculpatory prewarning statement 
that somehow overlaps with statements made in the postwarning 
interrogation.”). 
 345. See United States v. Salazar, No. CR 18-3500, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18477, at *90–105 (D.N.M. Jan. 31, 2020) (describing Seibert and confusion in 
the Tenth Circuit about how to apply it). 
 346. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 347. See People v. Krebs, 452 P.3d 609, 646 (Cal. 2019) (distinguishing 
Seibert and declining to pick the plurality or the concurrence); People v. 
Mitchell, 822 N.W.2d 224, 224 (Mich. 2012) (echoing the line from Dixon 
despite Michigan not having decided which opinion in Seibert applies). 
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that formally adopted Justice Kennedy’s opinion,348 and others 
are from jurisdictions that selected the plurality opinion as 
governing.349 Perhaps this phenomenon suggests that courts 
remain confused about the Seibert decision, even after the 
jurisdiction’s appellate courts purport to settle the matter.350 
The line from Dixon might provide an attractive opportunity to 
escape the issue altogether. 
2.  The Magnitude of the Problem Is Unclear 
 Whatever the cause, “no earlier confession to repeat” is 
steadily gathering adherents in the lower courts. Three state 
high courts now endorse this view.351 Two federal circuits have 
also stamped the Dixon line with a modicum of imprimatur. In 
2018, an unpublished Third Circuit decision echoed the phrase 
from Dixon,352 and in 2019 the Sixth Circuit deemed the 
Michigan Supreme Court’s reading of Dixon “not unreasonable” 
 
 348. See, e.g., Currie, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98796, at *8–9 (restricting 
Seibert with Dixon in the Second Circuit, which adopted the concurring 
opinion). 
 349. See, e.g., Clifton, 892 N.W.2d at 131 (echoing the line from Dixon in a 
jurisdiction that adopted the plurality opinion). 
 350. See State v. Abbott, 812 S.E.2d 225, 231 (Ga. 2018) (overruling its 
own 2007 adoption of the plurality test). 
 351. See Krebs, 452 P.3d at 647 (citing Dixon and adding: “Significantly, 
[the police officer] advised defendant of his Miranda rights before defendant 
confessed”); Mitchell, 822 N.W.2d at 224 (citing Dixon and declining to apply 
Seibert because there was “no earlier confession to repeat”); Clifton, 892 
N.W.2d at 131 (“[E]ssential to a Miranda violation under Seibert is an 
inculpatory prewarning statement that somehow overlaps with statements 
made in the postwarning interrogation.”). 
 352. See United States v. Iles, 753 F. App’x 107, 110 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing 
Dixon and explaining in dictum that Seibert “does not apply because [the 
defendant] did not make any incriminating statements before she signed the 
Miranda waiver”); see also Reyes v. Lewis, No. 12-56650, 2016 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 15147, at *30 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 2016) (Callahan, J., dissenting) 
(claiming that “[if] ‘there was no earlier confession to repeat,’ Seibert would 
not apply . . . .”). 
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on habeas review.353 Other federal and state courts have more 
assertively adopted a categorical reading of Dixon.354 
The exact magnitude of the problem is unclear. Analyzing 
lower court opinions which apply Dixon can be especially 
difficult given the brevity of those decisions.355 For example, a 
Seibert argument is sometimes dispensed with in a single 
sentence on appeal.356 This makes it difficult to tell whether the 
court is properly distinguishing Seibert on the facts, or applying 
a categorical reading of Dixon.357 
 
 353. See Mitchell v. McLaren, 933 F.3d 526, 538–40 (6th Cir. 2019) 
(rejecting habeas petitioner’s argument that “the absence of a pre-warning 
confession is not the end of the [Seibert] analysis,” because the Michigan 
Supreme Court’s reading of Dixon was “not unreasonable”). 
 354. See United States v. Espinoza, 15-CR-30077, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
169570, at *11 n.2 (D.S.D. Dec. 17, 2015) (claiming in dictum that Dixon said 
there is no “impermissible two step interrogation because during the first 
interrogation the defendant maintained he did not commit the crime”); Sorto 
v. Stephens, H-10-CV-613, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132302, at *39–40 (S.D. Tex. 
Sept. 30, 2015), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 716 F. App’x 366 (5th 
Cir. 2018) (claiming that Dixon “mandates rejection” of a Seibert claim because 
there was no earlier confession to repeat); Jenkins v. Lee, 11cv6806, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 112168, at *61–62 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2014) (finding Seibert 
inapplicable because the defendant maintained innocence during the 
unwarned interrogation); United States v. Breal, 12-20152, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 192003, at *21 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2012) (distinguishing Seibert because 
defendant provided no inculpatory statements regarding the crime under 
investigation); State v. Martinez, 2 CA-CR 2012-0057, 2012 Ariz. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 1446, at *11 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2012) (stating that the “reasoning 
in Seibert did not apply to a case in which a defendant did not confess until 
after he had received Miranda warnings”); People v. Cabrera, G056329, 2020 
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4087, at *29 (Cal. Ct. App. June 29, 2020) 
(“[A]ppellant did not confess to shooting [the victim] until [after receiving 
Miranda warnings]. Accordingly, the Seibert decision is of no help to him.”). 
 355. See United States v. Lewis, No. 17-CR-168, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
200286, at *17 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 24, 2018) (disposing of a Seibert argument with 
the quote from Dixon and one other sentence). 
 356. See, e.g., Iles, 753 F. App’x at 110 (“Furthermore, Seibert does not 
apply because [the defendant] did not make any incriminating statements 
before she signed the Miranda waiver.”). 
 357. Compare, e.g., Foddrell v. Lavalley, 12 Civ. 6562, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 105905, at *23–25 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2016) (using Dixon properly in a 
single paragraph analysis of a Seibert issue), with Sorto v. Stephens, 
H-10-CV-613, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132302, at *39–40 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 
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Although the actual prevalence of the issue is unclear, 
treating a single line from Dixon as a categorical rule is 
erroneous. Seibert should apply regardless of whether there was 
an “earlier confession to repeat.” 
III.  SEIBERT OUGHT TO APPLY TO QUESTION-FIRST 
INTERROGATIONS, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER AN EARLIER 
CONFESSION WAS ELICITED 
A.  “No Earlier Confession to Repeat” Was Dictum, Not a 
Holding of Dixon 
As a textual matter, lower courts’ reliance on “no earlier 
confession to repeat” is misplaced because that phrase was mere 
dictum.358 The phrase arises in Dixon as one factor among many 
used to distinguish Seibert.359 Nowhere in Dixon did the 
Supreme Court state that a question-first interrogation is 
impossible if a suspect does not confess during the unwarned 
portion of the interview.360 Based on the circumstances of 
Dixon’s case, the Court simply factored the lack of an earlier 
confession into its consideration of the “overlapping content” of 
the two interviews.361  
As discussed in Part II.B, the Dixon Court applied a 
truncated version of the plurality Seibert test.362 The Court 
 
2015) (claiming that Dixon “mandates rejection” of a Seibert claim if there is 
no earlier confession to repeat). 
 358. See Bobby v. Dixon, 565 U.S. 23, 31–33 (2011) (distinguishing Seibert 
on the basis of three different plurality test factors); see also Dictum, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “obiter dictum” as “a judicial 
comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary 
to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential”). 
 359. See Dixon, 565 U.S. at 31–33 (discussing other facts that 
distinguished Seibert). 
 360. See id. at 23–33 (lacking any per se rule that limits Seibert where 
there is no “earlier confession to repeat”). 
 361. See id. at 31–33 (using “no earlier confession to repeat” language 
amidst a generalized comparison between Seibert and Dixon). 
 362. See id. (discussing “overlapping content,” the timing and setting of 
the first and second interview, and the degree to which the interrogator’s 
questions treated the second round as continuous with the first); Missouri v. 
Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 615 (2004) (creating plurality test). 
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considered the second, third, and fifth factors (without 
specifically referencing any test) in concluding that Dixon was 
not subjected to a question-first interrogation.363 Because the 
Court concluded that no question-first interrogation had taken 
place, Elstad, and not Seibert, applied.364 
B.  Drawing the Line at “Confessions” Would Make Seibert 
Unworkable 
As a practical matter, reading Seibert to exclude 
question-first interrogations that fail to elicit “confessions” in 
the unwarned phase would be as unworkable as it is incorrect. 
Courts would be dragged into litigating the meaning of the word 
“confession,” rather than applying Miranda’s bright-line rule.  
A “confession” generally refers to “a criminal suspect’s oral 
or written acknowledgement of guilt, often including details 
about the crime.”365 Patrice Seibert’s statement to police—that 
she knew the victim was supposed to die in a fire—is consistent 
with this definition.366 Not all inculpatory information, however, 
comes in the form of a full-throated confession.367 Prosecutors 
are often able to use neutral statements or denials by suspects 
as proof of culpability.368  
 
 363. See Dixon, 565 U.S. at 23 (“In this case, no two-step interrogation of 
the type that concerned the Court in Seibert undermined the Miranda 
warnings Dixon received.”). 
 364. See id. at 32–33 (upholding Ohio Supreme Court’s application of 
Oregon v. Elstad). 
 365. Confession, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 366. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604 (admitting responsibility to police). 
 367. See Mitchell v. MacLaren, 933 F.3d 526, 539 (6th Cir. 2019) 
(recounting that a suspect did not “confess,” but admitted to being at the 
location of a murder on the night that it occurred); Pollard v. Parris, No. 
20-00017, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86821, at *68 (M.D. Tenn. May 18, 2020) 
(observing that the defendant’s pre-warning statements “arguably implicated” 
him in a murder, but fell short of a “full-blown confession”). 
 368. See 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S 
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 804.06 (2d ed. 1997) (noting that neutral statements may 
still be admissible under the penal interest exception to hearsay). 
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Consider what happened in the Johnson case.369 For more 
than four hours, Bobby Johnson was interrogated by 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg police without first receiving Miranda 
warnings.370 He consistently denied involvement, but many of 
the things that he said could have significant inculpatory value 
in the hands of a prosecutor.371 For example, Johnson said: 
“That [DNA evidence] put me there, man. That right there just 
took my life. That right there just took my life.”372 “I want to 
help you bad.”373 “I’m about to lose my life.”374 “I’m tore apart. 
I’m destroyed right now.”375  Johnson also told police, “I don’t 
want to be in prison the rest of my damn life,” and said he felt 
sick to his stomach.376 None of these statements are 
“confessions,” as lower courts categorically applying Dixon 
require.377 But all of them have inculpatory value, in that they 
tend to make Johnson look guilty. 
This point helps to illustrate why the Miranda exclusionary 
rule makes no subtle distinctions based on content.378 When 
statements are suppressed under Miranda, all of the unwarned 
 
 369. See supra INTRODUCTION. 
 370. See State v. Johnson, 795 S.E.2d 625, 628 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017) 
(“Approximately four hours after entering the interview room, Defendant was 
placed under arrest for murder, and approximately ten minutes later, after 
additional conversation, he was read his Miranda rights and signed a waiver 
of those rights.”). 
 371. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 368, § 804.06 (noting that even 
neutral statements can be inculpatory). 
 372. Johnson, 795 S.E.2d at 629. 
 373. Id. at 630. 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. at 631. 
 376. Id. at 630. 
 377. See Mitchell, 933 F.3d at 539 (upholding the Michigan Supreme 
Court’s categorical reading of Dixon, which found Seibert inapplicable because 
of the lack of a confession despite multiple inculpatory statements by the 
defendant). 
 378. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966) (“[U]nless and 
until [Miranda] warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at 
trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against 
him.” (emphasis added)). 
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statements are suppressed.379 This rule is eminently more 
logical and workable. Imagine the absurdity of a situation in 
which Miranda exclusion only applied to unwarned 
“confessions.”  
SUSPECT: I didn’t do anything. I was at the bar all night; 
how would I have killed anyone? . . .  
 
SUSPECT: Alright, I did it. He owed me money. 
In this scenario, if Miranda exclusion only applied to 
“confessions,” then a trial court could only exclude: “Alright, I 
did it.” The second part of his answer (“He owed me money.”) 
would still be admissible. So would the other statement: “I didn’t 
do anything. I was at the bar all night.” Neither of these 
statements are “acknowledgements of guilt,” but they both have 
significant inculpatory value.380 “He owed me money” provides 
the prosecution with a motive; “I was at the bar all night” is an 
alibi which could later be disproved. 
In short, drawing a line at “confessions” fabricates an 
eminently unworkable rule from an unsound reading of Dixon. 
C.  The Specific Dangers and Rationales Identified in Seibert 
Apply Regardless of Whether Police Elicited a Confession in the 
Unwarned Portion of the Interview 
Lower courts’ interpretations of Dixon are inconsistent with 
the three specific dangers identified in Seibert: (1) timing; (2) 
confusion; and (3) “cat out of the bag.”381 Notwithstanding the 
language from Dixon, all three threats created by question-first 
interrogations still apply even in the absence of an unwarned 
confession. 
The first threat is timing.382 The longer the unwarned 
portion of the interview, the more unlikely it is that a suspect in 
 
 379. Id. 
 380. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 365 (defining confessions). 
 381. See supra Part II.A.5. 
 382. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 611 (2004) (describing the 
reduction in effectiveness when interrogators wait for a “particularly 
opportune time” to give Miranda warnings). 
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a custodial interrogation setting will perceive a meaningful 
right to silence or counsel.383 This threat is present regardless 
of whether a suspect has confessed to the police. Once again, the 
Johnson case illustrates this phenomenon. Police subjected 
Johnson to intense interrogation for more than four hours before 
giving him Miranda warnings.384 During that time, Johnson 
was in a “police-dominated atmosphere,” entirely isolated from 
the outside world.385 How could the warnings have been effective 
under those circumstances? How could Johnson have perceived 
a meaningful choice about speaking or invoking his rights? 
The second threat is confusion.386 According to the Seibert 
plurality, a midstream recitation of legal rights is likely to 
disorient a suspect and throw the suspect off-balance.387 This 
threat is actually heightened where a suspect has not made an 
earlier confession.388 Otherwise, why would the police need to 
disorient or confuse the suspect? Using Miranda as a “sword” 
can be particularly effective when the suspect’s will is about to 
break down.389 The warnings function as a “forceful shove,” not 
an advisement about legal rights.390 
The Johnson case also illustrates the confusion 
phenomenon. Although Johnson maintained his innocence in 
the unwarned portion of his interview, the prolonged 
interrogation eroded his will.391 The detectives then arrested 
him and Mirandized him “to make [him] understand that this 
 
 383. See id. at 620 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The Miranda warning was 
withheld to obscure both the practical and legal significance of the admonition 
when finally given.”). 
 384. State v. Johnson, 795 S.E.2d 625, 628 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017). 
 385. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445 (describing “incommunicado 
interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere”). 
 386. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613 (plurality opinion) (discussing 
“perplexity” and “bewilderment” caused by midstream warnings). 
 387. Id. 
 388. See supra Part II.A.5. 
 389. See supra Part II.A.5. 
 390. See supra Part II.A.5. 
 391. See Johnson, 795 S.E.2d at 628–33 (relating Johnson’s escalating 
reactions to questioning, including that he felt suicidal).  
 
504 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 451 (2021) 
 
isn’t going to go away.”392 The formal arrest and issuance of 
warnings pushed Johnson over the edge: he denied involvement 
for four hours, but implicated himself only twenty minutes after 
receiving Miranda warnings.393 
The last threat of question-first interrogations identified in 
Seibert is the “cat out of the bag” problem.394 This occurs because 
of the psychological effects of disclosure: the bubbles don’t go 
back into the bottle after you uncork champagne.395 This threat 
is arguably not present when a suspect fails to make any 
inculpatory statements during the unwarned portion of the 
interrogation. For example, if a suspect were to remain silent 
for the entire unwarned portion of the interview, there would 
likely be no psychological compulsion created by his reticence. 
However, if a suspect makes inculpatory statements which fall 
short of full confessions, there still may be a “cat out of the bag” 
problem. Once a suspect makes statements that he believes are 
incriminating, the suspect might think that he has no 
meaningful choice but to continue talking.396  
Although it is difficult to know for sure, this threat might 
have been present in the Johnson case as well.397 After making 
repeated incriminating statements (that fell short of 
confessions), Johnson might have been subject to lingering 
 
 392. Id. at 633. 
 393. Id. at 632–33 (noting that Johnson confessed only about twenty 
minutes after receiving Miranda warnings). 
 394. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 613 (2004) (“Upon hearing 
warnings only in the aftermath of interrogation and just after making a 
confession, a suspect would hardly think that he had a genuine right to remain 
silent . . . .”). 
 395. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 311 (1985) (describing a “subtle 
form of lingering compulsion, the psychological impact of the suspect’s 
conviction that he has let the cat out of the bag, and in so doing, has sealed his 
own fate”). Note that this argument was rejected in Elstad. See 470 U.S. at 
311–12. But as Part II.A.5 observes, it remains alive and well in the Seibert 
context. 
 396. See supra Part II.A.5. 
 397. See State v. Johnson, 795 S.E.2d 625, 628–33 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017) 
(recounting repeated inculpatory statements short of confessions). 
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psychological compulsion from his “conviction that he has let the 
cat out of the bag, and in so doing, has sealed his own fate.”398 
Finally, the Seibert Court’s apparent rationales apply 
regardless of whether a confession was elicited in the unwarned 
portion of the interview.399 If the Supreme Court in Seibert was 
reacting to gamesmanship by police departments, exempting 
interrogations that failed to produce unwarned confessions does 
not make any sense. Such a rule would only encourage 
gamesmanship, because police could simply interrogate “outside 
Miranda” until the suspect approached the breaking point.400 
Like Johnson, the suspect might make inculpatory statements 
that fall short of confessions.401 Like Johnson, the suspect might 
show increasing signs of physical and emotional distress.402 And 
like in Johnson’s case, the police might withhold Miranda 
warnings until a confession becomes imminent.403 
The false confession rationale similarly applies whether or 
not the suspect confessed during the unwarned portion of the 
interview. Question-first interrogations compromise the 
effectiveness of Miranda warnings, potentially increasing the 
likelihood of a false confession.404 Imagine that Bobby Johnson 
was innocent.405 After being confronted with evidence which 
 
 398. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 311. 
 399. See supra Part II.A.6. 
 400. See Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 
109, 132–40 (1998) (describing police interrogation practices “outside 
Miranda”). 
 401. Johnson, 795 S.E.2d at 628–33 (describing Johnson’s reactions to 
questioning). 
 402. Id. 
 403. Id. at 632. 
 404. See supra Part II.A.6.  
 405. The plausibility of this scenario depends on the accuracy of the DNA 
test provided to the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department. See Johnson, 
795 S.E.2d at 627 (“[T]he DNA analysis indicated that only one in 16,600,000 
African-Americans could have been the contributor of the DNA recovered from 
under [the victim’s] fingernails, and that Defendant was one of those African 
Americans [sic] who could have contributed that DNA . . . .”); Mandy Locke et 
al., Scathing SBI Audit Says 230 Cases Tainted By Shoddy Investigations, 
RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER (Aug. 19, 2010, 2:00 AM), https://perma.cc/B8AH-
22WV (last updated Feb. 15, 2015) (describing decades of substandard forensic 
practices at the North Carolina state crime lab). See generally Matthew Shaer, 
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purported to guarantee his conviction, and after making 
repeated statements which appeared inculpatory, Johnson 
might have concluded that the best thing to do was to confess, 
whether it was true or not: “I’m already dead, should I just kill 
myself all the way?”406 
CONCLUSION 
Seibert was a 2004 case.407 More than fifteen years later, 
some police officers continue to conduct question-first 
interrogations.408 As a result, a reading of Dixon that constrains 
the applicability of Seibert can have real consequences for 
criminal defendants. It can be the difference between a 
suppressed statement and an admitted one, which in turn might 
be the difference between “not guilty” and “guilty.” 
Any criminal procedure decision, of course, has 
consequences for criminal defendants. But the consequences 
imposed by lower courts’ interpretations of Dixon are rooted in 
an erroneous reading of that case. To treat a single line from 
Dixon as a categorical rule that limits the scope of Seibert is to 
misread both decisions. The dangers created by “question-first” 
interrogations potentially exist regardless of whether police 
succeeded in obtaining an unwarned confession. And the 
rationales of the Seibert Court in striking down question-first 
 
The False Promise of DNA Testing, ATLANTIC (June 2016), 
https://perma.cc/KJ7A-RA8D (last visited Oct. 18, 2020) (discussing growing 
awareness of methodological problems with forensic DNA evidence). 
 406. Johnson, 795 S.E.2d at 633. 
 407. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
 408. See United States v. Bradley, 370 F. Supp. 3d 458, 473 (M.D. Pa. 
2019), vacated, 959 F.3d 551 (3d Cir. 2020) (suppressing custodial 
interrogation taken in violation of Seibert); United States v. Palacio, No. 
TDC-18-0619, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 215114, at *26–39 (D. Md. Dec. 12, 2019) 
(suppressing statements because of a Seibert violation); People v. Penelton, 
No. 2-17-0408, 2019 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1694, at *15–21 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 
12, 2019) (applying Justice Kennedy’s concurrence to suppress postwarning 
statements); State v. Gallegos, No. 78401, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 201, at *6 
(Nev. Feb. 21, 2020) (applying plurality test to affirm suppression of 
post-Miranda statements); United States v. Gasaway, No. 19-cr-27, 2019 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 193512, at *13–20 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 6, 2009) (suppressing 
statements after careful consideration of plurality factors). 
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practices are similarly applicable even when such practices do 
not result in unwarned confessions. 
The uncertain repose of Seibert complicates this problem. 
Lower courts might be especially eager to avoid a Seibert 
analysis altogether because of the confusion about the 
governing opinion in that case. By treating “no earlier 
confession to repeat” as a per se rule, they can simply say that 
Seibert does not apply. As a result, crystalline clarity can only 
come from the Supreme Court.  
The Supreme Court, however, has rejected multiple recent 
petitions for certiorari on the Seibert decision. One case, Wass v. 
Idaho,409 asked the Court to decide whether the plurality 
opinion or Justice Kennedy’s concurrence was the governing 
opinion in Seibert.410 Although it was relisted several times and 
attracted some public interest,411 the Court denied certiorari.412 
Bobby Johnson’s case—the facts of which were discussed 
throughout this Note—similarly failed to obtain a writ of 
certiorari in 2019.413 
The Supreme Court should affirm the plurality opinion as 
the governing Seibert decision. Because the plurality opinion 
focuses on the experience of the suspect, rather than the intent 
of the officer, it is a more workable standard for measuring the 
effectiveness of Miranda warnings. The Supreme Court should 
also emphasize that a pre-warning confession is not a necessary 
condition for a Seibert violation. Clarification of the Dixon and 
 
 409. 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018). 
 410. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Wass v. Idaho, 138 S. Ct. 2706 
(2018) (No. 17-425) (“When an officer ‘questions first,’ is the admissibility of 
the suspect’s post-warning statement governed by the four-judge plurality’s 
objective, suspect-focused test, or Justice Kennedy’s subjective, officer-focused 
test?” (citations omitted)). 
 411. See Wass v. Idaho, SCOTUSBLOG, https://perma.cc/4AA9-HZEX (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2020) (profiling the case on popular Court-watching blog and 
recording five relists). 
 412. See Wass, 138 S. Ct. at 2706 (denying certiorari). 
 413. See Johnson v. North Carolina, 140 S. Ct. 122, 122 (2019) (denying 
certiorari). 
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Seibert issues will resolve confusion in lower courts about the 
meaning of those decisions.414  
In order to increase the likelihood of appellate clarification, 
advocates in lower courts should seek to suppress statements 
taken during question-first interrogations, even if—and 
especially if—those statements possess inculpatory value but 
fall short of confessions. It may well be that defense attorneys 
are not raising Seibert issues or preserving them on appeal, 
thinking that the lack of an unwarned confession makes Seibert 
inapplicable. Although some lower courts have already reached 
the issue, other courts might (and should) reach opposite 
conclusions, increasing the chances of resolution in the nation’s 
highest court. 
At the conclusion of Justice Souter’s opinion in Seibert, he 
wrote, “Strategists dedicated to draining the substance out of 
Miranda cannot accomplish by training instructions what 
Dickerson held Congress could not do by statute.”415 
Question-first interrogations are stratagems, even when there 
is “no earlier confession to repeat.”416 When they “drain the 
substance” from Miranda by depriving warnings of their 
effectiveness, any statements elicited after Miranda warnings 
should be excluded. 
 
 
 414. Although a detailed discussion of Marks is outside the scope of this 
Note, a case clarifying Seibert might also potentially serve as a vehicle for 
reexamining the narrowest grounds doctrine. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 415. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 617 (2004). 
 416. See Bobby v. Dixon, 565 U.S. 23, 31 (2011) (distinguishing Seibert in 
part on the basis of “no earlier confession to repeat”). 
